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Net/Work: Composing the Posthuman Self 
 
Julia L. Mason 
 
ABSTRACT 
The overall question this dissertation asks is: what does it mean to teach 
posthumans? To answer this question, this dissertation turns toward scholarship 
on the body in order to understand the virtual and material presence that students 
develop, it looks to online video gaming communities as alternative classrooms 
providing effective models of learning, and it investigates the circulation of service 
learning pedagogies within academic institutions as a marker of the persistence of 
humanistic values within the framework of a posthuman work environment. 
The American university in general, and the humanities specifically, is 
struggling to make sense of its place in a culture shaped by fast capitalism, 
oppositional politics, boutique multiculturalism, social hierarchies, free markets, 
technological revolution, international conflict, and a host of other phenomena that 
challenge the university as a site of traditional humanistic inquiry. At the same 
time, these forces highlight the university’s more modern roles in the knowledge 
economy as a credentialing service, gatekeeper, and commercial incubator. Such 
conditions represent yet another crisis of humanism. The contemporary 
posthuman world to which universities are beholden is characterized by 
transgressed boundaries, flexible identities, radical transparency, ubiquitous 
  
  iv 
technology, networked subjectivity, and a loss of confidence in the universal 
narratives and notions of essential humanity that provided impetus to Western 
thinking for millennia. Colleges are struggling, whether they know it or not, to exist 
in, and prepare students for, this posthuman world.  
Perhaps the greatest promise of a responsible posthuman education is the 
potential to produce citizens who are critically technologically literate and able to 
rethink their relation to political systems, to the environment, to economies, to 
technologies, to work, and to leisure, without totally abandoning the humanistic 
values attendant to a liberal education. Part of this education must include 
enabling students to see social systems as technologies which can be adopted in 
order to produce different modes of being. Only then can the productive tension 
between humanism and posthumanism become a part of higher education. 
 1 
Chapter 1 
 
 Introduction: Ecce Post-Homo 
 
Instead of the standard “Man of the Year,” the phrase “Machine of the 
Year” graced the 1982 cover of Time magazine, with the accompanying line, “the 
computer moves in.”1 This cover art depicts two figures—a man on the left and a 
machine on the right—each taking up similar space on the page. The machine, 
while hardly futuristic looking, appears more modern when contrasted with the 
simple red desk atop which the machine sits. The screen is bright blue, with two 
small bolts of yellow jutting downward on the screen. It’s difficult for a viewer to 
determine what (if anything) is being displayed on it. On the left half of the cover 
is a man, of perhaps forty or fifty years and balding, seated and gazing at the 
computer’s screen. We can’t see much of his face, since he is turned toward the 
machine. His arms and hands rest limply in his lap and his whole body is washed 
in a grey-blue color that makes him look more like a stone sculpture than a living 
human. He is motionless. Man and machine are separate here, and the man 
stares blankly at the screen, perhaps in amazement. This image suggests that 
man and machine are different, separate, and perhaps even distant. The human 
and the inhuman meet but do not incorporate. 
With the exception of 1988, when earth was named “Planet of the Year,” 
each year between 1983 and 2006, Time selected a man, woman, or group to 
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adorn their annual cover. In 2007, however, man and machine appeared on the 
cover once again. The 2007 “Person of the Year” was “you.” In a use of 
magazine cover technology that was critiqued as silly and crude, the editors 
placed a semi-reflective mirror-like rectangle on the cover. The reader sees 
herself, and thus, “You”, are 2007’s person of the year. On seeing the cover, or 
perhaps, seeing her own image on the cover, she may almost miss the means by 
which “you” are reflected. Around the mirror material you can barely see the edge 
of a slim computer screen. Human and machine are no longer distinct; they are 
one. This is the posthuman moment.  
The melding of man and machine is a popular, if simplistic, marker of the 
posthuman. It is a powerful image. Feminist scholar Donna Haraway uses the  
figure of the cyborg, a man/machine blend, as a means to examine feminism, 
politics, and technology.  Haraway’s notion of the cyborg is, in part, a criticism of 
what might be called the traditional feminism of the late twentieth century.  She 
considers this feminism limited by the very binary subject positions it seeks to 
undermine.  In a sense, adopting the vocabulary of binaries only serves to 
reinforce their existence and their power.  In her 1991 article, A Cyborg 
Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth 
Century, Haraway employs the cyborg as a metaphor through which to explore 
the implications of feminism and feminist theory beyond binaries and beyond 
boundaries.   
Through this cyborg metaphor, Haraway argues for the rejection of identity 
politics in favor of affinity politics, which in Haraways view, is a more useful 
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political/ideological position from which to advance the aims of feminism.  The 
cyborg, a melding of human and machine into a cybernetic organism, is a 
thorough mixing of all those elements that we might consider opposed, for 
instance, male/female, mind/body, and human/machine.  These mixes are so 
inextricably blended that they cannot be separated and perhaps, cannot be 
distinguished.   
To some, it is frightening to realize that humans and machines might be 
linked so strongly that they cannot be separated.  In some cases, their parts are 
so indistinguishable that it is impossible to identify what is natural and what is 
artificial.  It is perhaps this fear that has driven individuals to try to understand the 
implications of this aspect of posthumanism.  Popular films such as Terminator, 
as well as sci-fi classics such as the 1956 film Invasion of the Body Snatchers, 
examine what happens when the wholeness and “purity” of the natural human 
body is threatened, and in effect, attempt to reconcile the effects of 
posthumanism.  Posthumanism represented in popular culture allows us to see 
that the “crisis in humanism is everywhere.  Neil Badmington, cultural critic and 
theorist, notes that “the reign of Man is simultaneously being called into question 
by literature, politics, cinema, anthropology, feminism, and technology” (9). Thus, 
both the autonomy and supremacy of man is being questioned in nearly every 
aspect of modern existence.   
 In the years since the popularization of the personal computer in Western 
cultures, we see an increasing number of articles, books, video games, and 
movies each depicting and interpreting various meanings of posthumanism to 
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individuals, communities, and larger cultures. Newspaper, internet, academic 
articles, and longer works that discuss the relationship between man and 
machine are quite commonplace, appearing in every discipline from art to 
medicine to business. Pop culture explores the implications of posthumanism 
through various visual means, creating video games, science fiction serials, films, 
music and so on, through which both the promising and hopeful aspects of 
man/machine hybrids, as well as the more horrific and graphic possibilities of 
man/machine blends can be investigated.   
In scholarly writing, it may seem that we have arrived at the end of the 
debate about what posthumanism looks like. With cell phones in our pockets, 
mp3 players in our ears, and email and internet video at our fingertips, the 
technologically-enabled cyborg may be the student who just walked into your 
classroom. Of course, the cyborg figure also provokes a certain anxiety that 
Allucquére Rosanne Stone, in her article “Will the Real Body Please Stand Up?: 
Boundary Stories about Virtual Cultures,” titles “cyborg envy.”  She explains 
cyborg envy as the desire to transcend the boundaries that separate human from 
machine, a desire “to penetrate and merge” (108).  This suggests the possibility 
that those interested in posthumanism are putting too much faith in the 
technologically-enhanced body to lead us away from humanism.  
Academic treatments emerging from posthumanism have provided 
thoughtful discussions on topics such as the ethical issues surrounding medical 
advances, communication technologies, labor mechanization, and fictional 
worlds. Each of these investigations necessarily places these technologies in the 
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context of some definition of the human, and these technologies’ expansion or 
contraction of the humanity of the subject. In the past, it was easy to describe 
and investigate new technologies in terms of their relationship to humans—how 
they made our lives easier, what they could help us do better and faster, and 
what new things they could help us accomplish.  As technology becomes more 
present and more advanced, it is taking over many of the activities previously 
undertaken in cooperation with humans. Machines are doing things all by 
themselves.  As the technology has changed, our relationship to technology has 
also changed, requiring new and better ways to mediate our connection.  The 
increasing autonomy of machines has demanded new ways of thinking and 
talking about the human-machine connection, especially in the past few decades.   
 
Education, Literacy, and Technology 
The proliferation of personal computers in the 1990’s brought 
technological literacy to the forefront of discussions about education in the United 
States. While the U.S. Department of Education was defining technological 
literacy as “computer skills and the ability to use computers and other technology 
to improve learning, productivity, and performance” (Getting 5), the academy was 
developing more nuanced and careful definitions.  
This new attention to technology and its use in education developed into 
an entirely new area for study, complete with its own journals and scholars 
devoted to its examination.  Sponsored by The Council on Technology Teacher 
Education and the International Technology Education Association, The Journal 
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of Technology Education published its first issue in the Fall of 1989 in order to fill 
a gap in the scholarly conversation where practitioners and theorists could 
exchange dialogue about the place of technology in public schools, particularly 
as it was becoming more and more accessible.  In those early issues, 
contributors discussed issues surrounding the use of technology in the classroom 
and its use in individual disciplines, pedagogical practice, and areas for further 
study.  All of these areas, in some manner, contributed to our changing 
understandings about issues of technological literacy.     
In a 1993 issue of The Journal of Technology Education, Walter Waetjen 
cautions, “[technological literacy] surely cannot be a neutrally intended term since 
it is related to educational endeavors and all such endeavors are laden with 
purpose or value, whether we like it or not, and whether we intend it or not” (9). 
Issues of technological literacy are laden with political and ethical debate, as well 
as the strong economic and social pressures attendant to all education.  In 
communication scholarship, theorists have shaped our understanding of the 
posthuman by building upon the discussions of technological and electronic 
literacy.  For the most part, these understandings have included both the 
promises and problems of this evolving literacy. 
The definition of technological literacy offered by the U.S. Department of 
Education adopts a rosy view of the effects of our use of technology, one which 
promises progress and improvement in measurable quantities such as 
productivity. In Cyberculture, Cyborgs and Science Fiction: Consciousness and 
the Posthuman, William Haney calls this the “friendly version of posthumanism, 
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[in which] tools such as the pen or the computer are not just external aids but 
integral aspects of the problem-solving systems that civilizations have developed 
over the ages” (59). In other words, this approach to technological literacy 
humanizes technology by placing it within the narrative of human progress and 
continuous improvement. In this narrative, technology does not threaten the 
category of the human because humans have dominated it to their will, and thus, 
humanism is not in crisis.  
This narrative ignores the more threatening aspects of posthumanism 
which transgress the boundaries of identity, meaning, and knowledge. It ignores 
the possibility that the “irreversible process often referred to as progress tends to 
strip the human body and mind of their systems of initiative and defense, 
reassigning these functions to technological artifacts” (Baudrillard 34). This is 
Baudrillard’s invocation in “Prophylaxis and Virulence” of the fear voiced by 
Socrates over 2000 years ago that writing would destroy one’s memory, that 
technology will assume the very functions which make us human. It’s a truism 
that as our world becomes more technologically advanced, the number of people 
who have a firm understanding of the technologies enabling everyday life 
decreases.  
Consider the case of Alaska senator Ted Stevens, who when discussing 
net neutrality (the idea that content and services on the internet should not be 
restricted), said this about the internet: “It's not a big truck. It's a series of tubes.” 
Earlier he explained that “an Internet” (what most would call an “email”) sent by 
his staff had been delayed—perhaps he believed the tubes were clogged. Not 
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only are politicians afflicted with such technological illiteracy. Consider how 
increasingly difficult it is for people to fix their own cars, to identify the parts of 
major appliances, or to explain how a UPC code reader works. To paraphrase 
Arthur C. Clarke: any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from 
magic. 
The goal of technological literacy is not simply to get people to understand 
the mechanics of and the jargon associated with the machines around them. Nor 
can technological literacy simply mean the ability to use technology. Both 
approaches leave individuals unprepared to perceive the ideological values 
embedded in all technologies. Rather, the proliferation of newer and more 
abundant technologies demand Cynthia Selfe’s "critical technological literacy," 
which she defines as "the complex set of socially and culturally situated values, 
practices, and skills involved in operating linguistically within the context of 
electronic environments, including reading, writing, and communicating” 
(Technology 148). Such a critical literacy requires more than being able to 
operate within technology-saturated environments, but also to recognize how 
these environments operate on us, and to recognize the mutually constitutive 
relation we have with technology, a relation which is never just an enhancement 
(or corrosion) of our humanity, but a recognition of a dialectic without which 
humanity could not be conceived.   
A step beyond technological literacy, critical technological literacy, Selfe 
says, encourages a “reflective awareness of these social and cultural 
phenomena.” Now firmly in the posthuman era, it is time to revisit our 
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understanding of critical technological literacy in order to both better utilize 
technologies and to examine the ideological values from which and through 
which these technologies function. By reflecting on the state of higher education, 
this dissertation hopes to advance a critical understanding of the posthuman 
fusion of human and machine, and a shift towards understanding human as 
machine. 
 
Critical Posthumanism 
"The posthuman does not really mean the end of humanity." 
- N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman 
 
This dissertation attempts to theorize the relation between the posthuman 
and higher education by looking at three sites of inquiry: bodies, classrooms, and 
institutions. These sites do not exhaust the points of contact between the 
posthuman and the academy. Nor do they attempt to predict the origins or goals 
of posthumanist theory. Rather, posthumanism’s own insistence on the 
significance of the complexity of embodiment and materiality suggests the 
relevance of selecting positions from/in/through which to understand the lived 
experience of posthumanism. The positions of student, teacher, and 
administrator (or, if you like, the locations of desk, classroom, and office), will be 
used to understand the evolving relationship between posthumanism and higher 
education. The overall question it asks is: what does it mean to teach 
posthumans? To answer this question, this dissertation turns toward scholarship 
on the body in order to understand the virtual/material presence that students 
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maintain, as well as pedagogies that incorporate video games and service 
learning in order to prepare students for posthuman work and leisure 
environments. 
As Katherine Hayles notes in the statement above, the posthuman does 
not mean an end to humanism; it does not mean an end to the belief in the 
centrality of the human experience (and the human in experience). 
Posthumanism does not attempt to ring the death knell of the subject because to 
do so would be to deny the always already constructed nature of subjectivity, to 
imagine a pure state of selfhood from which technology now separates us. As 
Neil Badmington writes: “There is no pure outside to which ‘we’ can leap. To 
oppose humanism by claiming to have left it behind is to overlook the way that 
opposition is articulated” (9). To critique humanism is to speak the language of 
man that constitutes humanism. Just as Derrida’s deconstruction used the 
language of the text to enable deconstruction, thereby inhabiting the text even 
more fully, we can only extend posthumanism by inhabiting the language and 
concerns of the humanistic tradition. As Richard Rorty put it, the “trouble with 
arguments against the use of a familiar and time-honored vocabulary is that they 
are expected to be phrased in that very vocabulary” (8). The vocabulary (and 
influence) of humanism can not be dismissed, nor should it be.  
One might say that we have always been posthuman, especially if one 
recognizes the many ways in which humanism has recurrently been in crisis. In 
Ecrits, Jacques Lacan said that after Freud, who identified an unconscious 
motivation to our conscious action, “the very centre of the human being was no 
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longer to be found at the place assigned to it by a whole humanist tradition” 
(114). By positing an unconscious which influenced the thoughts and actions of a 
person without it being readily available for scrutiny, Freud undercut the notion of 
a rational and self-aware ego upon which post-Enlightenment humanism was 
built. This is the initiation of the modern crisis in humanism—the scientific 
observation that we are neither in total control of our own bodies, nor totally 
aware of our own selves. But we no longer need Freud to feel that the essence of 
our humanity is in question. Our vastly increased exposure to media, the decline 
in traditional communities, the diversification of American culture, the integration 
of international economies, and the development of terror and fear as weapons in 
global conflict have all intensified this feeling of loss of control.  
The composing of the self to which this dissertation’s title alludes is not 
simply a reference to an impossibility, or to a nostalgia already deconstructed by 
postmodern and poststructuralist accounts of subjectivity, but rather an 
admission that humanism continues to be a significant force because subjectivity 
has always been constructed in collaboration with other bodies, discourses, and 
technologies. To be human is to part of a dynamic distributed system of thought, 
word, and image which necessarily limits the usefulness of binaries such as 
human/inhuman or private/public. Critical insights from a number of different 
theoretical schools enable us to track the composition of posthuman subjectivity.  
William Spanos tells us that there are many “manifestations of 
posthumanist theory—Heidegger’s destruction, Derrida’s deconstruction, Lacan’s 
psychoanalysis, Kristeva’s semiotics, Foucault’s genealogy, [and] Althusser’s 
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neo-Marxism” (189). Michel Foucault explicitly links the construction of self with 
intentional techniques he has called “technologies of the self”: those activities 
which "permit individuals to effect by their own means . . . a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies, and souls, thought, conduct, and way of being" 
(Technologies 18). Humanism is always in process and “never manages to 
constitute itself; it forever rewrites itself as posthumanism” (Badmington 9). 
The American university in general, and the humanities specifically, are 
struggling to make sense of its place in a culture shaped by fast capitalism, 
oppositional politics, boutique multiculturalism, social hierarchies, free markets, 
technological revolution, international conflict, and a host of other phenomena 
that challenge the university as a site of traditional humanistic inquiry. At the 
same time, these forces reinforce the university’s more modern roles in the 
knowledge economy as a credentialing service, gatekeeper, and commercial 
incubator. Such a turn towards vocationalism represents yet another crisis of 
humanism. The contemporary world is characterized by transgressed 
boundaries, flexible identities, radical transparency, ubiquitous technology, 
networked subjectivity, and a loss of confidence in the universal narratives and 
notions of essential humanity that provided impetus to Western thinking for 
millennia. Teachers, students, and administrators are struggling, whether they 
know it or not, to exist in a posthuman world.  
But “making sense” of such phenomena may be precisely what is making 
it difficult for higher education to fully embrace posthumanism, for meaning is 
conventionally a belief in the consequentiality and centrality of human action, 
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meaningfulness made available through the human faculties valued by 
Enlightenment means of inquiry. The idea of a university is, put simply, founded 
in humanism. As Spanos notes in The End of Education: Towards 
Posthumanism, the assumptions of the “modern humanist university—its abiding 
commitment to disinterested inquiry, to general education (the core curriculum or 
common body of indispensable knowledge), and to the principle that the 
university constitutes a value-free (apolitical) space” are extensions of the 
Enlightenment project which puts its ultimate faith in humanity as opposed to a 
divine or supernatural figure (xvii). But these commitments can no longer be 
assumed. Increasingly, universities are moving toward interested inquiry 
(commercially viable and sponsored research), away from general education (in 
the shape of specialized degree programs), and toward politicized curriculums 
(witness the ongoing debates over indoctrination fueling the proposals of an 
Academic Bill of Rights by the likes of David Horowitz).  
In light of these movements, the liberal humanism on which higher 
education is often justified may be fueling an ongoing crisis that originated in a 
contradiction between the humanist roots of academia and the posthuman world 
into which students are graduating and to which universities are attempting to 
appeal. In fact, Spanos identifies this crisis as emerging from the structure of the 
university itself, which divides knowledge into disciplinary types, separating 
philosophical inquiry from scientific inquiry—truth from power. It is only in 
recognizing the “complicity of truth and power” underlying both liberal and 
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conservative reforms, he writes, that we can develop programmatic alternatives 
that do not merely return us to an uncritical humanism (xiv).  
The remainder of this chapter provides an introduction to posthumanist 
theory, emphasizing the ways in which the traditionally humanistic goals of higher 
education relate to the posthuman world where students, teachers, and 
administrators exist. It considers current academic treatments of the posthuman 
and the tendency to associate the posthuman most strongly with technological 
change, rather on the many changes in material, political, and economic 
conditions of social life that affect what it means to be human. It identifies three 
major areas of posthumanist inquiry that will resurface throughout all of the 
chapters: changes in our ideas of humanity, identity, and community. 
 
Humanity Redux 
“There is in effect something that humans are or have to be, but this 
 something is not an essence nor properly a thing: It is the simple 
 fact of one’s own existence as possibility or potentiality.”  
– Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community 
 
As Neil Badmington points out in the introduction to his edited collection, 
Posthumanism, even such an ambiguous term may serve as a “convenient 
shorthand for a general crisis in something that ‘we’ must just as helplessly call 
‘humanism’” (2). Humanism is no simple concept.   
Tracing the term “humanism” through its use in various scholarship, 
Badmington posits that “humanism” is a “wonderfully vague concept,” one whose 
meaning depends greatly on the context in which it is used (2). In America and 
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Britain, for instance, the term was heavily associated with secularism. While this 
tradition serves to posit humanism as a progressive alternative to the domination 
of autocracy and theocracy, in Humanism and Anti-Humanism, Kate Soper notes 
that it also “appeals (positively) to the notion of a core humanity or common 
essential feature in terms of which human beings can be defined and 
understood” (11–12).  Even among its scholars, there is divergence in its 
definition.   
The helplessness Badmington references above is a recurrent theme in 
discussions of posthumanism. In 1977, Ihab Hassan wrote that posthumanism 
was a “dubious neologism” that may be “another image of man’s recurrent self-
hate” or a “hint at the potential in our culture” (Qtd. in Badmington 2). He further 
stated that “five hundred years of humanism may be coming to an end, as 
humanism transforms itself into something that we must helplessly call 
posthumanism.” This sense of loss (of control, of tradition, of identity, of a center, 
of purpose, of comfort) is part of the crisis of humanism. In order to distinguish 
what is rejected, lost, and/or modified in the movement to posthumanism, it may 
make sense to start off with some discussion with what is at stake in the term 
“humanism.”  
Discussing humanism in a 1977 interview included in Language, Counter-
Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interview, Michel Foucault explains why 
the ideology of humanism has maintained its hold on western culture.  Foucault 
states, humanism is the  
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. . . totality of discourse through which Western man is told. . . . Humanism 
invented a whole series of sovereignties: the soul (ruling the body, but 
subjected to God, consciousness (sovereign in a context of judgment, but 
subjected to the necessities of truth), the individual (a titular control of 
personal rights subjected to the laws of nature and society), basic freedom 
(sovereign within, but accepting the demands of an outside world and 
‘aligned with destiny’). In short, humanism is everything in Western 
civilization that restricts the desire for power.: the theory of the subject (in 
the double sense of the word) is at the heart of humanism and this is why 
our culture has tenaciously rejected anything that could weaken its hold 
upon us.” (“Revolutionary” 221–22)  
Foucault here provides some explanation for the tenaciousness of humanism 
and the subjectivity it supports. In this case, humanism is supported by a series 
of “sovereignties”—self-contained ruling “entities” in their own right that 
complicate each other and that constitute humanism.  But even though Foucault 
describes such concepts as soul, consciousness, individuality, and freedom as 
sovereign ruling powers acting upon the “self,” they are themselves contained 
within the larger economy of humanism that subjugates them.  Without 
humanism, Foucault suggests, the desire for power would exist unrestricted, 
leaving current power structures open to critique and challenge.  
In “Foucault and the Politics of Resistance” Brent Pickett moves 
Foucault’s project forward in a way that is somewhat different than other scholars 
by understanding Foucault as a theorist of democracy.  This understanding is the 
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means though which Pickett gets at “The humanist question, ‘What Is Man?’.”  
Pickett explains that this question “assumes that man has an ahistorical essence, 
and thus eliminates the possibility of critique, of reflexive self-creation and 
autonomy" (451–52). For Foucault, humanism is therefore a conservative force 
necessary for maintaining the status quo, since it is through a concept of the 
human that individuals accept current power relations, seeing them as an 
extension of the human essence, and therefore constrain their desire for radical 
change. 
Perhaps this, limiting the desire for change, is why Donna Haraway 
describes her “Cyborg Manifesto” as an “ironic political myth.” She describes 
using irony as a “rhetorical strategy and a political method” that she would like to 
see used in feminism to hold “incompatiple things together because both or all 
are necessary and true” (149).  At the center of this irony is the cyborg, a figure 
that “is our ontology; it gives us our politics” (69; 70).  Haraway cautions against 
remaining locked within the “comfortable old hierarchical dominations” 
maintained in traditional institutions of knowledge and power and the reassuring 
endorsements of subjectivity and identity presented in narrative and law (77).  
Posthumanism gives us the means by which to function outside of those 
hierarchies.  Moving outside old hierarchies necessitates “fundamental changes 
in the nature of class, race, and gender” that attend an increasingly 
interconnected world. The new world order emerging from posthumanity “not only 
undermines the justifications for patriarchy, colonialism, humanism, positivism, 
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essentialism, scientism, and other lamented –isms, but all claims for an organic 
or natural standpoint” (76). Knowing that one is human is no longer enough. 
The loss of a clear and exclusive definition of the category of “human” 
leads us to ask the question asked by Jean-François Lyotard in The Inhuman: 
“What if human beings, in humanism’s sense, were in the process of, constrained 
into becoming inhuman . . . what if what is ‘proper’ to humankind were to be 
inhabited by the inhuman?” (2). In this posthuman world, we find the body and 
the mind no longer opposed, but integrated as part of a larger circuit that extends 
beyond the individual, incorporating other bodies, other minds, and other 
machines into one’s existence. We are no longer merely parts of systems; we are 
systems.  
Envisioning the body as an integrated system is not unrelated to the move 
to an information economy. In the information economy, individuals have access 
to an unprecedented amount of information that requires us to find ways to 
process, filter, and manage it.  Because data is stored in servers and on hard 
drives and electronically reproduced, essentially, it is never destroyed.  This glut 
of information remains invisible within a database until processed and presented, 
and demands increasingly sophisticated visualization techniques to make the 
data coherent. As Johndan Johnson-Eilola, a communication theorist who deals 
with issues surrounding the information economy, writes, such databases “can 
no longer be processed by the user as a coherent structure, but constitutes a 
data cloud” (200). The many online services that allow users to establish 
personalized “portals” through which they can connect to selected information 
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feeds and network with acquaintances of their choosing are a marker of the 
degree to which the technologies needed to process large amounts of 
information have become part of our personal identities.  
And information does not merely flow to the user. With the introduction of 
web 2.0 technologies that allow users to supply the content of web sites, this is 
also a world in which we are increasingly defined by the information we offer 
willingly as online text or uploaded media. Consider, for example, the incredible 
growth in the content of a site such as YouTube, which allows users to contribute 
to the database and offers tools for users to sort, select, and comment on its 
content.  Not all information is willingly given, however; much is unknowingly 
collected about us through internet cookies and other (less benign) code scripts. 
Companies mine this surreptitiously collected data, for instance, in order to 
discover patterns that can help them identify potential consumers. In the 
contemporary world, all of us have taken on a virtual identity that is being 
recorded and analyzed elsewhere. 
 
Identity Redux 
“In cyberspace, I can change my self as easily as I change clothes.               
Identity becomes infinitely plastic in a play of images that knows no  
           .end. Consistency is no longer a virtue but becomes a vice;       
  ….integration is limitation. With everything always shifting,  
everyone is no one.”  
– Mark C. Taylor and Esa Saarinen, Imagologies 
 
Over the last fifty years, composition scholars have developed various 
methods for understanding the construction and maintenance of identity and 
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meaning through writing and for designing and assessing effective methods for 
enhancing student literacy.  At the heart of most pedagogies’ practices is the 
assumption of a proper method of engagement. Where humanism posits a 
difference between the subject and the object, posthumanism unearths the 
always-already relational nature of being. Thus, where humanists might attempt 
to understand the role of technology in social life as a question of humans 
controlling technology or technology controlling humans, posthumanists see an 
interdependent and mutually controlling relationship and move on to questions of 
production and consumption rather than strategies of dominance. 
Academic accounts of subjectivity have yet to fully articulate the 
implications of posthumanism for educational institutions, nor have teachers 
determined how best to accommodate these changes pedagogically. Social 
construction approaches to identity recognize that the “self fabricates a coherent 
identity” from available materials, but in talking of subjects in general, it is 
common to fall into a form of environmental determinism that reduces this self-
fabrication to the convergence of systemic forces (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 145). 
Brian Massumi has argued in his book Parables for the Virtual that most 
accounts of subject formation “emphasize systemic structurings,” embrace a 
language of positionality (of one’s location on a grid, within an “oppositional 
framework of culturally constructed significations”) and treat the body as merely 
the “local embodiment of ideology” (2–3). These accounts fail to grasp the 
complexity of human subjects, he argues, because they portray individuals as 
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inhabiting static identity positions between which movement is possible rather 
than as subjects continually in motion.  
Massumi’s critique of social constructionist theories of subjectivity 
corresponds well with Mark C. Taylor’s description in The Moment of Complexity 
of the change from the “Cold War system [of grids] to network culture” that Taylor 
argues began in 1989 (23). According to Taylor, a movement from walls to webs 
was significant because “walls divide and seclude in an effort to impose order 
and control, [and] webs link and relate, entangling everyone in multiple, mutating, 
and mutually defining connections” (Moment 23). Living in posthuman network 
culture constitutes a change in what it means to be a subject—a “self—if, indeed 
this term any longer makes sense—is a node in a complex network of relations. . 
. . subjectivity is nodular” (Moment 231). Nodular selves, according to Masumi, 
must necessarily accept what he calls the body’s “incorporeal materialism”—the 
interweaving of the material and the virtual (15). Only then can we see our bodies 
as “incarnations of worldwide webs and global networks” (Taylor Moment 17).  
Living in such a world is, to use Jean-François Lyotard’s term, living with 
the differend—the convergence of incommensurable language games in a world 
increasingly connected and interdependent, a world in which discourses slide 
across each other like Saussure’s signifiers, revealing the complexity and 
messiness of being an effective composer, citizen, and intellectual. Posthumanity 
exposes the constructedness of all discourse, especially that composing 
humanism. As Foucault writes, “[p]osthumanism exposes the secret behind the 
grand narratives of humanism, the ‘secret that they have no essence or that their 
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essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms’” (“Nietzsche” 
142). As another form of constructedness, posthumanism thus constitutes both a 
challenge to and an extension of the humanist project—an extension which 
opens up the term human to include the very concepts and notions once 
considerd to be in opposition to it, such as machines.    
In How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, 
and Informatics, Katherine Hayles notes that the idea of a more inclusive 
definition of “human” is not new.  She notes that a controversial test proposed by 
Alan Turing in his 1950 paper "Computer Machinery and Intelligence," lays bare 
the anxiety about the openness of the human. In this test, the subject sits in a 
room with two computer terminals and uses them to communicate with two 
entities in order to determine which is the machine and which is the human. In an 
earlier experiment by Turing, he asked people to interact with two people via 
computer terminal and determine which was a man and which was a woman. It 
was Turing’s thesis, reports Hayles, that “If you cannot tell the intelligent machine 
from the intelligent human, your failure proves, Turing argued, that machines can 
think” (How xi). For Hayles, it is not important whether a person can determine 
the difference between man, woman, or machine. Rather, the “important 
intervention comes much earlier, when the test puts you into a cybernetic circuit 
that splices your will, desire, and perception into a distributed cognitive system in 
which represented bodies are joined with enacted bodies through mutating and 
flexible machine interfaces” (How xiv). The design of the test already shows our 
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posthuman identity by placing us into a network made of man, woman, and 
machine.   
Identification of who is and who is not a human being has been a common 
element of work attempting to deal with the crisis in humanism.  It is not 
surprising to find that works of science fiction are illustrative examples. Based on 
Philip K. Dick’s novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?  Ridley Scott’s 
movie Bladerunner perhaps best exemplifies the anxiety over the lack of 
difference between the human and the artificial. In this film, the main character is 
an expert in telling the difference between humans and replicants—robots who 
are so nearly identical to human beings that most cannot distinguish one from the 
other. The Turing test attempts to ascertain how prepared we are for an age in 
which technology has called into question who and what qualifies for the label of 
“human.” Hayles argues that such an age is already upon us. Hayles explains 
that a later test, one designed originally by Hans Moravec and carried out by 
Turing, was “designed to show that machines can become the repository of 
human consciousness—that machines can, for all practical purposes, become 
human beings.”  Hayles announces, “you are the cyborg, and the cyborg is you” 
(How xii). The narrowing difference between human and machine is at once 
exciting and threatening; whether one identifies with humanism or posthumanism 
determines how one responds to living in the “polymorphous, information system” 
that Haraway calls the “informatics of domination” (77).  
Much of the scholarship on posthumanism deemphasizes the traditional 
focus on meaning that is at the center of humanism, and instead looks at social 
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life as an assemblage of machines both human and inhuman. Perhaps best 
known for their collaborative work on capitalism, Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari argue, it is accurate to think of ourselves, literally, as machines. In their 
work Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari explore how we are neither organisms 
(unified wholes with a stable identity and knowable purpose) nor mechanisms 
(mechanical objects with a prescribed functionality), but “desiring machines” 
focused on production rather than representation (5). Claire Colebrook, in 
support of her examination of Deleuze, explains that seeing ourselves as 
machines denies us the solipsism of the Romantic notion of identity: 
. . . [b]ecause a machine has no subjectivity or organising center, it is 
nothing more than the connections and productions it makes; it  is what it 
does. It therefore has no home or ground; it is a constant process of 
deterritorialization, or becoming other than itself. (55–56) 
Nodular subjectivity is machine subjectivity, an identity formed through relation 
and connectivity rather than in isolation. “Plugging in” is the prototypical move of 
cyborg subjects, not interpretation or representation; “every machine is a 
machine connected to another machine” (Deleuze and Guattari 6). The challenge 
of posthumanism to teachers and administrators is to develop programs that 
enable students to become critically literate in the technologies that compose 
posthumanism. These technologies are not simply the digital tools that we plug 
into the wall. These technologies are the modes of being, ways of thinking, the 
soft and hard skills of contemporary communication, and the ability to adapt and 
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develop skill sets appropriate to emergent technologies, modes of being, and 
ways of thinking.  
 
Community Redux 
“There is no end to the net. Every destination is a point of departure 
and every point of departure is a destination. Apparent terminals 
are actually relays in a circuit that is forever in motion.”  
- Mark C. Taylor and Esa Saarinen, Imagologies “Net” 12) 
 
Theorists of posthumanism often point to the internet as the realization of 
networked community. The internet offers seemingly infinite connectivity, 
allowing like-minded individuals to congregate despite physical boundaries. And 
much of the software native to the internet—hypertext, blogs, and wikis, for 
instance–is naturally interactive and/or collaborative. The latest application of so-
called “web 2.0” technologies which depend upon user-supplied content, as well 
as the emergence of new forms of intellectual property licensing, have heralded a 
new age of interactive communication and digital interdependence.  These are 
the same technologies that have led to announcing “you” as the Time magazine 
person of the year. In the academy, such changes have led to a closer 
interrogation of the visual aspects of communication, greater focus on multimodal 
genres, and an orientation to producing documents for public consumption. But 
the exact shape that online communities will take, and how these communities 
will overlap with, supplement, or replace face-to-face communities is still unclear. 
What is most important to note, however, is that these communities are just one 
 26 
instance of what posthumanists have predicted: communities built, not around 
racial or ethnic ties, but around shared interest and affiliation.  
Giorgio Agamben, perhaps best known for his work on biopolitics, explains 
in The Coming Community that it is possible for human community to exist 
without humanism. Part of Agamben’s project is to develop an ethics for human 
beings that rejects the idea of the individual as an example of an essential 
humanity. As he writes,  
the point of any departure for any discourse on [posthuman] ethics is that 
there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological 
destiny that humans must enact or realize. This is the only reason why 
something like an ethics can exist, because it is clear that if humans were 
or had to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical 
experience would be possible—there would only be tasks to be done. (43)  
Posthuman community must emerge without the comfort of moral certainty to 
guide it. Ethics must emerge when there is no code to which all participants 
proscribe, no authority which all recognize. It is “because of this things become 
complicated; precisely because of this ethics becomes effective” (43). 
Posthumanism in Agamben’s view is thus a more ethical worldview because it 
demands ethics for humans to live together. Such a community is classless, for 
technology has created “a single planetary petty bourgeoisie, in which all the old 
social classes are dissolved: The petty bourgeoisie has inherited the world and is 
the form in which humanity has survived nihilism” (63). It is not coincidental that 
the internet is the building site of such community, as it reproduces exactly, with 
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its openness, what Terry Eagleton calls the "bourgeoisie's dream of freedom": "a 
society of petty producers whose endlessly available, utterly inexhaustible 
commodity is discourse itself" (16–17). Cyborgs dream this dream well since, in 
Haraway’s words: “[w]riting is pre-eminently the technology of cyborgs” (81). 
Rather than individuals identifying themselves as members of a class—
human—that assumes the pre-existence of a natural set of qualities, Agamben 
calls upon humans to be “whatever beings” who are “expropriated of all identity, 
so as to appropriate belonging itself” (10).  It is a belief that this process of 
expropriation frees individuals from the “false dilemma that obliges knowledge to 
choose between the ineffability of the individual and the intelligibility of the 
universal” (1). Agamben writes, “The coming being is whatever being.” Because 
whatever being is never a stable identity, the one who speaks and acts 
. . . is always a multiplicity. Even within the person who speaks and acts. 
All of us are ‘groupuscules.’ Representation no longer exists; there’s only  
action—theoretical action and practical action which serve as relays and 
form networks. (Foucault and Deleuze 206–207) 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in their neo-Marxist Multitude: War and 
Democracy in the Age of Empire, take this notion of multiplicity and develop their 
own concept of the “multitude” throughout the text.  “Multitude” is their way of 
identifying the possibility of a cohesive proletariat that is neither caught in 
postmodern fragmentation nor unified under a single human banner.  Rather, it 
carries a sort of subjectivity that comes forth from commonality.     
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This figure of plural democracy, which refuses to discount the material 
specificity of its constituent singularities, is a perfect analog for posthuman 
beings. Hardt and Negri suggest that the multitude is a coalition always being 
assembled and reassembled, “creating the social relations and institutions of a 
new society” (348). By engaging individuals in the biopolitics of the “cooperative 
and communicative networks of social labor,” it “constantly creates a new social 
being, a new human nature.” This new social being is not merely virtual, since 
the  
. . . conditions of the production and reproduction of the social life of the 
multitude, from its most general and abstract aspects to the most concrete 
and subtle, are developed within the continuous encounters, 
communications, and concatenations of bodies. (Hardt and Negri 348) 
The posthuman is too often associated merely with the virtual digital horizons of 
cyberspace first made popular by William Gibson’s gritty vision of cyberpunk chic 
in his 1984 novel Neuromancer. Hardt and Negri remind us that bodies, (which 
cyberpunk texts often refer derisively to as “meat”), are an integral part of the 
posthuman circuit. We are not leaving them behind; we are acknowledging their 
potential as one of many nodes in the circuit of humanity. 
 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter 2 looks to the centrality of the body as a site of theorizing the 
posthuman, and examines how this centrality restricts posthumanism from 
advocating a progressive narrative of humanity and technology. It looks at 
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technologies of the self as markers of a posthuman relation to the body in which 
material and immaterial prostheses contribute to a networked subjectivity. For 
instance, it looks to the representation of bodies in video texts distributed as 
parts of business communication pedagogies as examples of our uneasiness 
with the posthuman. These examples provide models of the body’s role in a form 
of self-composing and gendered politics. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the pedagogical assumptions that inform modern 
pedagogy, considering the status of knowledge, experience, and technology in 
the posthumanist classroom. The expansion of online learning and the offering of 
classes using electronic communication tools such as blogs, wikis, and online 
audio and video, and even 3-D online spaces such as the Second Life online 
environment expand our notion of both the classroom and the traditional 
disciplinary formations of the academy. Specifically, this chapter looks at the 
educational potential of video games and the role that social networks may 
already play in the teaching of writing in our posthuman world.  
Looking primarily at the games King’s Quest and Everquest, this chapter 
maintains that modern video games provide situations in which being a 
successful gamer entails doing technical writing as a member of a gaming 
community. These communities provide a good example of how individuals 
inhabit the networked cognition attendant to posthumanism. Current theorists of 
video games in the field of education seem unaware of the vast scholarship in 
rhetoric and composition on the central role that communities play in the 
circulation of discourse and the maintenance of standards for that discourse. 
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Writing teachers, as long-time theorists of the social nature of discourse and the 
role of media in subjectivity, are well-positioned to take advantage of the 
educational potential of video games, and to explain the posthuman basis for 
their efficacy. 
Chapter 4 expands upon the previous chapter’s recognition of the 
education happening beyond the classroom to look at the institutional embrace of 
service learning. It considers the expansion of service learning as a 
materialization of the university’s networking with the community, but also 
questions the economic forces which limit the types of connections being made 
and the effect of such partnerships on the traditional goals of liberal education. 
Universities have embraced service as a way to create and distribute knowledge 
about the academy and its inhabitants in order to build market share. But rarely 
do educators acknowledge how the experience of service learning mimics and 
prepares for students for working in the distributed work environments enacted in 
posthuman workplaces. 
In the worst cases, service learning unintentionally legitimizes the 
authority of market-savvy institutions by providing them a way to signify their 
commitment to the public good while allowing them to avoid producing significant 
changes in the communities they serve. By looking at the conditions that have 
made service learning approaches more viable than other pedagogies in today’s 
academic climate, this chapter draws attention to how the institutional embrace of 
service learning in a knowledge economy is based, not just on humanistic 
justifications, but on posthumanistic ones as well. 
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Chapter 5 concludes by suggesting some ways in which universities may 
address the posthuman without simply denying the continuing influence of their 
humanistic legacies, economic pressures, students’ desires, and technology-
fixated policies. It looks to politics as the most necessary application of 
posthumanism, identifying insights about identity, community, and humanity that 
are inseparable form the desire for democratic governance, and to the 
relationship between the one and the many that underlies all posthumanist 
attempts to expand these categories. It questions the viability of virtual 
communities as critical habitats for posthumans, and suggests that the internet 
and other networking technologies are just as likely to be settled by those 
seeking to construct disengaged enclaves as they are to be appropriated by 
those seeking new forms of connection and distribution. The posthuman 
encompasses the full range of human discourse, and thus we should not be 
surprised when a posthuman education does not work the way we intend it to. 
Now, it is to bodies that I now turn in Chapter 2, to the original locus of 
posthumanist thought and its greatest challenge and resource. The body in 
posthumanism must be incredibly elastic, belonging not only to the individual but 
to the multitude, embodying not only one identity, but many, and serving not only 
as the interface with the physical world, but as the circuit through which the world 
interfaces with the individual. It can be the “meat” that must be transcended, or 
the fleshy palette which makes cybernetic enhancement possible in the first 
place. It provides access to an array of rhetorics based on visual, oral, textual, 
and haptic (tactile) systems of meaning. It is, in short, the embodiment of all the 
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contradictions which make us simultaneously both human and posthuman. All 
the while, the subject must resist the body’s seductive offer of empirical solipsism 
and narcissistic privacy. Posthumans need not leave their bodies behind to 
escape humanism, but they do need to recognize it for the technology that it is. 
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 Chapter 2 
Posthuman Bodies 
“To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to 
respond, to agree, and so forth. One participates in this dialogue 
with his whole life; with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his 
whole body and deeds.” 
- Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, “Towards a Reworking of the Dostoevsky  Book” 
 
The body, regarded as our primary interface with the material world and 
our enduring filter for physical experience, is the privileged site of humanism. For 
humanists, it is the housing of the senses, which is considered crucial to 
experience and thus to development.  A notion of individual development entails 
the recognition that individual identity is subject to change. The humanist 
conception of such change is cast in terms of self actualization. Clearly, the 
notion of self actualization challenges the mind/body binary of the Cartesian 
“cogito ergo sum.” Nevertheless, the humanist self of an integrated mind and 
body remains a singular embodiment of subjectivity.   
The humanist self is a self-enclosed one where the mind resides within the 
body and where the body is, in a sense, free from those element s outside of it.  
This conceptualization of the humanist self, of the body as a singular entity, may 
serve to limit posthuman thought.  In reality, the body is affected by any number 
of outside networks. 
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The self is a configuration of information patterns we are just now able to 
see as something that doesn’t really belong to us. Medical researchers, for 
instance, have identified a host of organisms that reside within the human body, 
organisms that depend on us for survival and upon which we depend to survive 
as well. It’s hard to follow a strict humanism when one learns that our bodies, 
whose fingerprints and other physical features are commonly used to establish 
identify, do not belong to us alone.  
According to Michel Foucault, the fact that our bodies are the home of 
identity and dis-identity does not mean they can serve as the basis for any 
intellectual project, humanist or posthumanist. He writes, 
The body is molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by 
the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, 
through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances. . . . Nothing 
in man—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis of 
self-recognition or for understanding other men. (“Nietzsche” 153) 
The body, according to Foucault, cannot be considered a vehicle by which an 
individual might break free of regimes if the promise of this freedom is based 
upon some inherent internal stability. But as the physical site of all of these 
regimes of truth, however, the body can at least be considered useful for the 
project of understanding how such regimes operate. These circuits of power and 
knowledge are traced upon our flesh.  
The focus on the body as a singular entity, even one overrun by social 
networks and cultural signification, may limit posthuman thought. Even when 
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posthuman theorists praise the machinic assemblages that attempt to break from 
the mold of autonomous selfhood, the most important component in the system 
is the human.  It is the privledged human component that unifies the entire 
system. The human might now be much better understood as an integrated 
cyborg, but it is still the cyborg’s humanity that is of the most interest.  
The emphasis on the human in the posthuman sheds new light on the title 
of the opening chapter, “Ecce Post-Homo.” “Ecce Homo” are the Latin words in 
the Vulgate translation of the Gospel of John spoken when Pontius Pilate 
presents Jesus to a crowd right before his crucifixion. The phrase is most 
commonly translated as “behold the man.” Friedrich Nietzsche borrows this 
phrase for his autobiography written late in his life, and adds the subtitle “How 
One Becomes What One Is.” This subtitle highlights the circularity of being—the 
always-alreadiness of our post-humanity. Wherever one looks for the human, 
one must also behold the post-human. 
 In this chapter, I will examine the circulation and representation of various 
bodies in pedagogical and public texts as a way of making visible the traces of 
our humanism and posthumanism, and of our attitudes toward the material and 
the virtual. I am concerned throughout with the many ways in which the body is 
implicated in education.  
 
Of Patterns and Presence 
It is hard to imagine our bodies not being present. In “Can Thought Go On 
Without a Body?”, Lyotard concludes that “thought and the body [are] 
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inseparable” in that “each of them is analogous to the other in its relationship with 
its respective (sensible, symbolic) environment: the relationship being analogical 
in both cases” (135). This analogical relationship means that thinking machines 
that work from a binary logic simply cannot reproduce human thought, which is 
why Lyotard calls upon engineers to “take the body as model in the manufacture 
and programming of artificial intelligence.” Some posthumanists have associated 
this analogical capacity with the dialectic of pattern/randomness, a dialectic that 
recognizes the various ways that humans make sense of the chaos of 
experience. Hayles argues in How We Became Posthuman that posthumanism 
eschews the binary of presence/absence in favor of a dialectic of 
pattern/randomness because, 
. . . meaning is not front-loaded into the system, and the origin does not 
act to ground signification . . . . Rather than proceeding along a trajectory 
toward a known end, systems evolve toward an open future marked by 
contingency and unpredictability. (How 285) 
Posthumans are willing to live with uncertainty, with bodies and identities that 
cannot be depended upon to be stable. Living in a posthuman age means that 
we must process and produce information, despite our realization of instability.  
To negotiate information and to interact with the world, both pattern and 
randomness are important.  Hayles agues that in the age of postmodernism, both 
pattern and randomness are “complements or supplements to one another.  
Each helps to define the other; each contributes to the flow of information 
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through the system” (“Virtual” 152). As such, each component of the dialectic is 
vital in the construction of identity and the creation of meaning.   
 It is important to remember that this shift to a dialectic of 
pattern/randomness is a shift away from a binary of presence/absence. Consider 
the teaching of writing. Traditionally, the value of writing and speech is 
understood through the presence/absence binary. As in any binary, one term is 
always favored, and in this case, it is “presence,” which is most commonly 
associated with the availability of the body to the senses, unmediated by 
technology. Such a binary asks us to accept that the presence of a speaker 
ensures that the speech is unmediated.  Since the speaker is not present, writing 
is secondary to speech.  Thus, it is not uncommon for scholars doing historical 
research to find that audience members believed that the written text offered only 
an imperfect copy of the text as presented orally. When students are tutored to 
detect within texts the presence of a strong thesis, of authorial voice and 
intention, of rhythmic and vivid language–all elements that supposedly make the 
text effective, one must acknowledge the degree to which these ideals are 
connected to our paradigm of communication as oral performance, a 
performance in which the body is present to the audience. 
Once the ideological roots of such an attitude towards speech and writing 
were recognized, we were able to consider the degree to which such descriptions 
were guided.  Not guided by any deficiency in the speech’s transcription, these 
attitudes were guided by the commonplace notion, as Leah Marcus explains, that 
“writing was not authoritative in itself, but only insofar as it served as a record of 
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speech, with the oral prototypon, evanescent though it was, retaining primary 
authority” (46). Such attitudes attempt to place speech into a direct relationship 
with meaning because the body is the representation of identity.  Thus, the 
favoring of the presence offered by speech is linked to the favor placed upon the 
body by humanistic thought. 
 
Metaphysics and the Masculine (and the Feminine)  
Of course, just as speech is favored over writing, so too is masculinity 
favored over femininity—each a privileged component of its binary set and each 
associated with authority, presence, and authenticity. Instruction in the 
development of voice attempts to guarantee that writing, which is seen as a trace 
of the absence of the speaker, maintains some of the authority attached to the 
originary speech. Writing, as Gayatri Spivak notes, “presents itself as the mark of 
an anterior presence, origin, master” (“Preface” xv). In many ways, such an 
attitude is traceable back to Plato’s theory of mimesis, which held that writing 
was a copy of speech, which itself was a copy of thought, where thought was 
considered a imperfect version of the concept in the metaphysical realm of ideas. 
Whereas Plato’s theory treated ideas as more real than the bodies that voiced 
them, more modern versions of this bias look to the body as the origin of 
authenticity.  
The privileging of the spoken word over the written word is so strong that 
Jacques Derrida has argued that a “metaphysics of presence” exists which 
assumes the “absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of 
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being, of voice and the ideality of being” (Grammatology 11–12). And many other 
“metaphysico-theological roots” cling to this binary arrangement (13). The 
primacy of logos—historically, the word of God—in modern discourse is just one 
way in which the favoring of presence reinforces other discourses of authority . In 
other words, the association of speech/text with presence/absence has far-
reaching implications for culture in general, especially when the 
presence/absence binary is interrogated in relation to other binaries, such as 
man/woman. The posthumanist attempt to focus on pattern/randomness as its 
structuring dialectic represents a recognition that different modes of being are 
only available if existing loci of power are challenged.  
The resilience of the presence/absence binary in discourses of authority is 
not uninterested, especially since presence has historically been associated with 
masculinity and absence has been associated with femininity. The influence of 
the metaphysics of presence, especially on those in dominant positions in social 
hierarchies, helps to account not only for claims of the superiority of an original 
oral performance over the printed record, helps to explain how such a 
commitment shapes social relations among men and women, relations invested 
with cultural meanings and mediated by oral utterances, bodily performances, 
and printed texts.  
In a society under the influence of the metaphysics of presence, women 
are often denied practice of authorized speech—speech to which presence is 
assigned. The source of authorized speech is often connected to the material 
public body—for example, a speaker in the public sphere who is granted the 
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privilege of the assumption of presence. Thus, the speech of women that 
circulates in the private sphere (“private” being in a binary relation to the 
assumed “public” field of male speech) is generally excluded from the male-
dominated economy of presence. 
Classical rhetorical training in oral performance provided strong support 
for the masculine identity project and the transmission of patriarchal values 
associated with the metaphysics of presence. As Andrew Williams writes of 
modernism, “The construction of a masculine identity is, in part, derived from the 
cultural importance a society attaches to the public behavior of its male 
members” (96). By mastering the “graceful command of social intercourse,” 
Williams writes, men are able to develop a sense of “autonomous selfhood” (97, 
96). Frances Yates provides a genealogy of the use of the body as an aid in 
public speech, the effective delivery of which often depended upon one’s 
memory. She writes that the “most universally known of all memory textbooks,” 
Peter of Ravenna’s 1491 Phoenix, sive artificiosa memoria, popularized the 
“classical principle that memory images should if possible resemble people we 
know” (Yates 113). This and other practices treated the body as a resource for 
developing the memory techniques considered necessary for oral performance. 
But these bodies, in order to be useful, needed to be associated with specific 
identities (“people we know”). Thus, even when the body was used as a 
technology, its usefulness was still predicated upon its close association with 
identity. 
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Men relied on this sense of selfhood available to them through public 
discourse to situate themselves within a history of privileged well spoken men 
and to embody, as Quintilian portrayed in his Institutio Oratorio, the performative 
ideal of the vir bonus dicendi peritus—the “good man speaking well.” Under such 
conditions, speech is the valued mode of interaction with others, and is a non-
trivial contribution to the maintenance of patriarchal values. In her work in 
examining the body as a site of power, Lynn Enterline claims that educational 
institutions participate in the maintenance of these values, and reinforce the 
association between speaking ability and subjectivity by drilling students in the 
“art of imitating other voices” as part of an undisclosed mission to produce 
“properly masculine subjects” (165). Thus, identity is produced through the 
disciplining of the body. 
Even though students in these schools did engage with the work of 
classical poets in textual (rather than oral) form and often produced translations 
and other written products, it is important to remember, Martin Elsky writes, that 
although “Learned Latin had been separated from its oral base for centuries, it 
remained aligned with the classical rhetorical tradition, which conceived of 
language as oratory . . . the tradition persisted long after oratory shifted from oral 
to written performance” (114). Other scholars have supported Enterline’s claim 
that such pedagogies embrace the practice of imitation where by students learn 
self-discipline through identifying themselves with a dominant model (Enterline 
166). For instance, in The Poetics of Primitive Accumulation: English 
Renaissance Culture and the Geneaology of Capital, Richard Halpern has 
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criticized pedagogies of identification from an Althusserian perspective as being 
one way in which male subjects became interpellated into patriarchal values. 
Gayatri Spivak even claims that such approaches instill a “desire to have a self” 
that can be made publicly known, which she calls a form of “masculinist 
centralism” (“Explanation” 204).  
The degree to which writing pedagogies that fail to question the economy 
of presence contribute to the conservative maintenance of social relations 
through identification is connected to the “great energy in saying over and over 
again what has been learned” that imitative pedagogies ask students to expend 
(Ong 41). The “formative power” of these pedagogies is in their commitment to a 
crude humanism which isolates the body of the speaker as the origin of the 
power of the communicative act (Enterline 25). As Derrida writes, “absolute 
presence is constituted as self-presence, as subjectivity,” a subjectivity that 
embraces the “absolute will to hear-oneself-speak” (Grammatology 16; Speech 
102). 
Posthumanist educators interested in avoiding the pedagogical 
reinscription of the metaphysics of presence might draw upon the scholarship of 
Cheryl Glenn. As part of her project to reclaim the “rhetorical accomplishment of 
historical women,” Glenn urges scholars to expand the study of “delivery 
(speaking and writing) to include the delivery of silence” (262). She admits that a 
“rhetoric of silence might seem peculiar, given the Western tendency to 
overvalue speech and speaking out,” but she challenges scholars to trace that 
which is usually considered trace-less, and to pursue the possibility of a 
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“specifically feminist rhetorical art” structured on productive absence (Glenn 263, 
262). The productivity of absence might be translated to the productivity of non-
connection from networks, providing some balance to the excesses of techno-
utopian posthumanism. 
Admittedly, developing a metaphysics of absence could result in simply 
inverting the hierarchical relationship between speech and writing (without 
necessarily displacing the humanist glorification of the body as the distillery of 
identity). Such an inversion is not inevitable because to study oral traditions is 
already to study the complex interplay of writing and speech, what Derrida calls a 
“plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence” 
(Grammatology 144). If technology were to deliver this plenitude without entering 
into the hierarchy of meaning created by humanism, posthumanists would have 
little to say.  
But the danger with today’s technological immediacy is that we feel that 
we have direct access to the speech because it is delivered in ways that seem 
less mediated, less separate from the body than past technologies. Unfortunately 
in this ideology, the more we ignore the material embodied context, the more 
accurate we believe the representation to be. It is tempting to believe that 
technologies such as online chat and video conferencing provide a more 
authentic medium for the communication of identity.  
We often forget that the interfaces through which we communicate are 
laden with political messages and agendas of their own. It is, perhaps, the 
seamlessness of the mediums that make them so difficult to identify and 
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examine.  An individual needs to look no further than the tiny advertisement in 
the corner of their computer screen to realize that their chat with a friend isn’t as 
pure as it first appears. However, when communication is synchronous, when 
information is immediate, it seems authentic.   
The immediacy of technologies such as teleconferencing, voice over 
internet protocol applications, and synchronous chat provide a false sense of 
authenticity.  As a result, the technologized subject of posthumanism reinscribes 
presence as the privledged term in its binary.  Presence continues to be a 
defining measure of the efficacy of human communication, and the body its 
primary source.  
 
Gender Machines 
“A starting point may be . . . to propose that gender, too, as both 
 representation and as self-representation, is the product of various 
 social technologies, such as cinema, and of institutionalized 
 discourses, epistemologies, and critical practices, as well as 
practices of daily life.” 
- Teresa de Lauretis, “The Technology of Gender” 
Gender is a machine hardwired into the body and networked into the 
circuits of discourse and technology. As de Lauretis suggests above, we are 
already plugged in to a number of technologies and discourses, all of which 
contribute to our understanding of ourselves as gendered subjects. As Anne 
Balsamo writes, gender is a “determining cultural condition and a social 
consequence of technological deployment” (9).The gendered body poses a 
special problem for posthumanists, especially those who are feminists as well. If 
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we have become posthuman, must we also have become postgender? Does the 
move to posthumanism mean the rejection of feminism’s valuation of the lived 
experience of men and women?  
Presumably, Lyotard would say no, since he claims that the analogizing 
power mentioned above is “inconsequential compared to an irreparable 
transcendence inscribed on the body by gender difference. . . . This difference 
makes thought go on endlessly and won’t allow itself to be thought. . . . this 
difference causes infinite thought” (“Can” 140). For Lyotard, posthumanist (or 
any) thought cannot exist without gender, which is a necessary part of our 
embodied apparatus for thinking in the world. 
Perhaps gender is, then, the condition to which can be traced what 
Lyotard identifies as our fascination with otherness and difference. Gender 
difference is not innocent, however. Unfortunately, the “abstract concept of 
gender ‘difference’ is reified as discrete gender identities” (Balsamo 159). In 
other words, difference may make thought possible, but it also makes possible 
the rigid binary system of gender (as well as race and other forms of bodily 
difference) that suggests that men and women are naturally and essentially 
different, opening the door to the inscription of what Edward Said calls 
“ideologies of difference” upon the body of the other (41). 
Many feminists, including Rosi Braidotti, Elspeth Probyn, Elizabeth Grosz, 
Linda Singer, Moria Gatens, Anne Balsamo, Susan Bordo, Alison Jaggar, Kathy 
Davis, and Judith Butler, have tried to reconceptualize the body within feminism. 
Elizabeth Grosz’s “corporeal feminism,” for example, attempts to provide an 
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understanding of gendered bodies that is “compatible with feminist struggles to 
undermine patriarchal structures and to form self-defined terms and 
representations” (“Notes” 3). Rosi Braidotti’s definition of the “feminist subject of 
knowledge” as “rhizomatic, embodied, and, therefore, perfectly artificial; as an 
artifact it is machinic, complex, endowed with multiple capacities for 
interconnectedness in the impersonal mode” directly appeals to the 
posthumanistic thinking of Deleuze in its invocation of rhizomatic machinic being 
(162). While not accepted by all feminists, some of whom feel that the focus on 
the body is retrogressive, their questions about gender promise to further 
understanding about posthumanism.  
In Volatile Bodies, Grosz asks: “do bodies, all bodies (even nonhuman 
bodies, it must be presumed), have a specifically sexual dimension (whether it be 
male or female or hermaphroditic) which is psychically or culturally inscribed 
according to its morphology?” (189). Grosz’s question points here to the now 
widely accepted distinction between sex and gender (between bodily forms—of 
which there are many more than two—and the culturally constructed norms 
associated with those forms). The portability of gender, even to the inhuman, 
seemingly sanctions the flexibility of posthuman identity, turning gender into just 
one more prosthetic, into one more machine that can be plugged into or left on 
the workshop floor. But this should also give pause to those who think that 
gendered technologies will somehow mean the end of restrictive expectations for 
gendered bodies. As Balsamo has shown in her discussions of cosmetic surgery, 
female body building, cyberpunk fiction, and virtual avatars, the “meaningfulness 
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of gender identity is reproduced in the application of new technologies” to the 
body (160). 
A series of ads circulated by Microsoft's Macintosh Business Unit (MacBU, 
a joint venture between Microsoft and Macintosh computers) is representative of 
the reproduction of gender identity through technology. When these ads ran, 
MacBU had already drawn the ire of many women when it announced that it was 
searching for the most "nimble, determined, Mac-wielding businesswoman 
around" in order, in beauty-pageant style, to crown her “Ms. M.o.X.i.e.” 
("M.o.X.i.e." stands for "Microsoft Office v. X Integrated Experience") (Dalrymple, 
“Searches”).  
Although the company viewed this promotion as a progressive recognition 
of women's strong presence in the business world, critics were quick to point out 
its conservative character. Within twenty-four hours of the Ms. Moxie contest 
being announced on MacCentral, an official online news service for Mac users, 
the online comments forum attached to the article was filled with over 150 
messages that predominantly condemned the contest, beginning with a message 
titled "When Equality Is Insulting" and ending with a message titled "Re: Most 
Insulting Contest Ever" (morphing along the way into "When Men are Insulting" 
and "M$ now seXist") (Dalrymple, “Searches”). Interestingly, a recurring concern 
of the respondents was the conflation of success in business with technological 
aptitude. 
At the same time women were being invited to identify with Mac products, 
the Macintosh computer, the Apple, was being identified as woman. The "Ms. 
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M.o.X.i.e" contest was announced in the same month that the MacBU ran a 
series of ads promoting the interoperability of Microsoft software on Macintosh 
hardware, lauded as showing "Macs and PCs sharing a meaningful friendship" 
(Dalrymple, "Launches"). Each ad showed a PC and a Mac computer engaging 
in some anthropomorphic activity such as playing chess by the pool, or watching 
a movie while eating Chinese food (the most recent series of televised Mac ads 
takes this analogy to its logical extreme, totally replacing the computers with 
human beings named “Mac” and “PC”). The text at the bottom of both print ads 
read: 
Macs and PCs have never been so compatible. Microsoft Office v. X. 
makes Macs and PCs more friendly. It lets Mac users effortlessly open, 
share, edit, and save any Office files to make working with PCs a breeze. 
Complete with easy-to-use exclusive Mac tools that simplify complex 
tasks. And it's built specifically for Mac OS X, so it's the most reliable, 
stable, easy-going Office ever. GO=> www.officeformac.com to download 
a free 30-day trial of Office v. X. today. 
These ads were generally well-received (at the least, they were better received 
than the Ms. M.o.X.i.e. contest), but gendered identity was still being reproduced. 
It is arguable that the visual presentation—the relative sizes of the PC and the 
Mac computers (the PC was larger), the domestic settings (poolside and in a 
family room watching TV, in two of the ads), and words like "compatibility" and 
"checkmate"—constituted a subtle gendering of the computers in the ads, 
suggesting specifically that Macs are female and PCs are male. There are other 
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gender markers specific to the individual ads. For instance, in the ad titled "Take 
Out Anyone?", the TV remote is positioned in front of the PC while a plate of 
untouched food sits in front of the Mac, matching the popular cultural conventions 
of men as inveterate channel-surfers and women as needing to have an aloof 
relationship to food. Whether the PC has eaten yet is unclear, but he has no 
plate and will seemingly eat straight from the box of Chinese food which sits in 
front of him, another culturally male convention.  
If we accept that these two computers are gendered in this way, then it 
becomes significant that the ads suggest that the "complex" Microsoft Office 
software is being made accessible to the Mac. In other words, accommodations 
are being made for the female so that "working with PCs is a breeze." Microsoft, 
as the monolithic, monopolizing, industry-dominating behemoth that it is, easily 
fills the role of domineering male presence, which the ad promises will be (in a 
newspaper’s Personals-section type of way) a "reliable, stable, easygoing" 
companion. The presumption is that women are less technologically adept than 
men and need assistance to bring them up to the functional level as men. The 
gendered machines of the MacBU ads suggest that “[s]exual differences are both 
the input and output of the technological production of gendered bodies”—even if 
these bodies are personal computers (Balsamo 158). 
 
Woman Incorporated 
The end of World War II saw many women returning from the factory to 
the kitchen, giving up jobs to men returning from military service overseas. Since 
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that time, women have found ways to increasingly leave the "private" sphere of 
domestic labor and enter the "public" sphere of business (though this distinction 
is not entirely accurate; women who enter business often do so in addition to 
their domestic duties). Numerous responses (including the questionable MacBU 
promotions described above) have emerged such as scholarships, associations, 
study programs, and awards, alternately promoting and welcoming women into 
business fields. In more popular media such as film and television, women have 
ceased to be depicted solely as mothers, housewives, and possible mates, and 
have been given professional identities as well.  
As Balsamo points out, pregnant women become a biological and 
eroticized spectacle in which the “womb serves as a metonym for the entire 
family body,” a move that endorses the use of reproductive technologies as 
“means for exercising power relations on the flesh of the female body” (80, 82). 
Representations of pregnant women “signify female gender in a way that 
reinforces an essentialist identity for the female body as the maternal body” (9). 
In significant ways, the professionalization of women in cultural narratives, like 
the working body of Rosie the Riveter, helped oppose reduction of woman to only 
wife and mother. 
But even if women today are being welcomed more fully to the sphere of 
business, it is important to interrogate the reproduction of gender ideologies in 
this process. Below I would like to consider two video-based texts that educate 
students in business communication skills. One of these texts is a video on how 
to give effective oral presentations called "Powerful Presentation Skills," which is 
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comprised of a series of videotaped lectures accompanied by bulleted 
Powerpoint-like graphics. The other is a CD-ROM supplement called “The Perils 
of Pauline” packaged with a popular business communication textbook.  
Most schools’ multimedia collections hold videos like “Powerful 
Presentation Skills,” which is a straightforward lecture-style presentation 
supplemented by video dramatizations about a woman named Carol who is given 
a business task by her manager that she feels unprepared for. In the course of 
her journey to master the art of giving a professional business presentation, 
Carol has help from three coworkers, two men and one woman. What is 
significant about the three coworkers is the difference between their backgrounds 
and how they are introduced in the video clips. The two men are a maintenance 
worker and an intern who arrive on the screen out of nowhere, with no 
introduction as to their backgrounds or credentials beyond their job titles (which 
are not notable). Yet these men are accepted as natural authorities (by Carol, 
and therefore by the viewer) about how to deliver effective presentations, 
dispensing information to Carol freely and confidently.  
The young male intern is working on a degree in graphic design, so his 
opinions about presentation slides is somewhat justified, but when he meets 
Carol in the copy room as she is making copies of overhead transparencies, he 
picks them up from the table uninvited and begins critiquing them with phrases 
like "This is confusing" and "This one's just dumb." Carol immediately asks him to 
show her how to do the overheads better, never challenging the authority of his 
discourse. It is almost impossible (and this is a symptom of the problem) to 
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imagine a female intern walking up and speaking the same way to a male 
employee about his professional work.  
When we are introduced to Carol's helpful female coworker (who is not a 
maintenance worker or intern, but an executive), we see her talking to a group of 
other professionals. As Carol approaches from the background, we hear all of the 
female coworker's associates compliment her on her excellent presentation skills 
(presumably, she has just finished giving a presentation). So, while men can 
appear on the screen with natural authority for giving presentations, viewers must 
be convinced of a woman's ability to dispense professional advice. It's almost a 
given she must be well-dressed and educated as well. In this video, men seem to 
be able to transcend their bodies and social positions due to their natural 
authority, while women must be presented to the audience in particular ways to 
establish their credibility. 
I want to turn now to a CD-ROM titled "The Perils of Pauline" (TPoP) and 
published by Prentice Hall in 1999 as a supplement to its popular textbook, 
Business Communication Today (5th edition, by John Thill and Courtland 
Bovée). In TPoP, the reader interacts with a series of on-screen episodes, each 
of which begin with an introductory video that establishes a problem at the 
workplace and then asks the reader to complete an exercise that will determine 
whether Pauline "succeeds" or "fails" at accomplishing the task to her boss' and 
coworkers' satisfaction. The reader is then presented with a "failure" video or a 
"success" video based on his or her performance on the exercise. Granted, the 
most heinous examples of gender stereotyping fall within those videos that 
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appear when Pauline "fails" to accomplish the task, but the entire product is 
infused with questionable assumptions about gender. 
The very narrative of a woman entering business unsure of her abilities 
and needing help (from the reader) to succeed is initially suspect (especially 
since we find out at the beginning of the CD-ROM that Pauline's sorority voted 
her "Most Likely to Succeed"; seemingly, this award has little to do with being 
prepared for the business world she is getting a degree to enter). It also doesn't 
help that the woman's name is "Pauline Peterson," with both first and last name 
being derivatives of conventionally male names (Paul and Peter, respectively), 
which are themselves closely associated with the patriarchal hierarchy of 
Christianity.  
The namesake of "Perils of Pauline" is actually an early 20th-century 
"cliffhanger serial" in which the main female character always wound up in a 
dangerous predicament at the end of the episode, only to be saved by the male 
character at the beginning of the next installment. That the CD-ROM authors are 
attempting to reconnect with this cultural paradigm of female helplessness 
suggests a conscious willingness to reproduce the ideologies that informed these 
films. The picture on the cover of the CD-ROM supplement is questionable as 
well, as it shows Pauline with her hands plastered to her cheeks as she opens 
her mouth in a wide "O," releasing a perpetual and silent scream at the terror of 
being asked to fulfill a business task which she presumably prepared for in her 
degree program.  
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While there is little overt discussion of gender in the workplace in "Perils of 
Pauline," there is ample attention to the notion of difference. In one episode, 
Pauline, to her audience's disbelief, makes a gross generalization about 
Japanese workers. In another, she insults two male East Indian software 
developers with whom she is sent to have lunch in order to procure a business 
deal. Cultural difference has an entire episode dedicated to it entitled 
"Intercultural Communication." This attention is surprising considering the many 
opportunities for the examination of gender relations in the CD-ROM.  
Over the course of the episodes, Pauline moves from a male to a female 
boss, has a crush on one of her coworkers, and in her second job ends up 
managing a male employee that she was previously managed by. One of 
Pauline's female coworkers does mention "sexual harassment" once, but only as 
a threat against one of her male coworkers when he makes a snide remark about 
her losing something because she used it as a bookmark in one of her romance 
novels. The other instance where the term "discrimination" arises is when 
Pauline is accused of discrimination against a male coworker whom she has 
been given the duty of firing, though the basis for the discrimination charge is 
vague. There are too many examples of gender-inflected choices made by the 
creators of TPoP to cover all of them in depth. I will provide a suggestive list 
below to show how gender identity, though never an explicit focus, colors the 
entire production:  
• In the introductory video to the entire CD-ROM, we are treated to a 
"photo album" of Pauline's life, where we see photos of her fulfilling 
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conventional gender roles by being dressed as a child ballerina and on 
the arm of a boy going to prom. The voiceover informs us that the only 
thing not "boring" about her high school years was the trouble-making 
of a boy named Herman Goldblatt, that she went to college where her 
sorority voted her "Most Likely to Succeed," and finally that she is 
being offered a job at a marketing firm.  
• Pauline's first boss is male and refers to himself jokingly as "god." 
Sometimes when the CEO's name is mentioned, angelic voices are 
heard (sometimes instead of saying the CEO's name, an individual 
gives a meaningful nod and the angelic voices start on cue). There 
seems to be no purpose for this except to associate the workplace 
hierarchy with the patriarchal hierarchy of organized religion. 
• We do not see female co-workers working. Instead we find them 
watching soap operas and reading romance novels. In fact, every 
comment from the romance-novel-reading coworker relates to a 
character in her romance novel, who reportedly sleeps with the CEO’s 
son in order to climb the corporate ladder. As far as the representation 
of the extracurricular concerns of males goes, Pauline's boss often 
refers accidentally to the sports he plays on company time (tennis, golf, 
bowling, swimming), and one male coworker, Leo, has a fascination 
with being abducted by space aliens. At first, Leo's fascination might 
seem to defy gender stereotyping, since it is not actively "male" like the 
boss's sports activity. But Leo himself is not associated with a macho 
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masculinity. His bow tie and sweater, excessive dramatics, and other 
signs mark him as homosexual, and therefore not bound to represent 
masculinity. But his fascination with UFOs is not fruitless like the 
female coworker's obsession with romance novels. At the end of the 
CD-ROM, he actually accomplishes his dream and is abducted by 
aliens. 
• An elderly female secretary mentions her sister once, but only because 
the sister is married to an East Indian man, and thus might have 
information valuable to Pauline for her lunch with two East Indian 
software developers. In other words, the secretary's sister becomes 
significant due to her marital status.  
• One featured female client of the firm (who owns a spaghetti sauce 
business, as opposed to the software business the East Indian male 
clients have) invites Pauline's manager to her home for dinner, though 
he is kicked out by the woman's mother when she finds out he's 
married. In Pauline's lunch with the East Indian men, the pretext for the 
meal is a business exchange. In the case of the spaghetti sauce 
episode, the meal is a pretext for a possible marriage. This episode 
extends to women in the workplace the insulting stereotype that 
women in college are “only there for an M.R.S. degree—i.e. to find a 
husband” (Rocker-Gladen). 
• When Pauline is fired from her first job (due to downsizing), she sends 
out résumés that she has carefully constructed. In the "success" video, 
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a fairy godmother appears to remind her to use the Prentice-Hall 
textbook to help her write her résumé (one of the pieces of advice the 
fairy godmother delivers: "make it look beautiful, like me"). At the end 
of the "success" video for this episode, even after sending out well-
written résumés, the interview she is granted is one acquired for her by 
a male coworker who was also fired.  
These are just some examples of the gender-inflected narratives that permeate 
this digital pedagogy of TPoP. At a time when what Cynthia Selfe calls the 
narrative of the “Un-gendered Utopia” has become popular among educators, in 
which we are called to “see and understand computers as educational allies that 
can support efforts to create new kinds of educational and economic 
opportunities for students—regardless of gender,” it is surprising to find such a 
thoroughly gendered production (“Lest” 306). Perhaps Selfe’s title says it all: 
“Lest We think the Revolution is a Revolution.” 
Not only does Pauline exhibit stereotypically female behavior, she is also 
continually framed as incompetent. And since the episodes are designed to be 
watched in any order, this incompetence recurs at the beginning (and sometimes 
end) of every episode. And Pauline is continually positioned against technology, 
of which she admits she has an "intense fear." In one video reminiscent of a 
cheesy horror flick, a copier even grows monstrous arms and reaches out to grab 
her when she tries to make copies. In another video episode, the male voice-
over, presented by a Rod Serling wanna-be from the "Technology Zone" 
describes Pauline as an outsider in the world of technology who is "young, eager, 
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but technologically ‘tacky.’” He even wonders whether the task of mastering 
technology will lead to "electronic eradication for our 'Everywoman.'" Thus, 
Pauline's incompetence becomes a synecdoche for the essential technological 
incompetence of all women.  
At a time when women are entering business and other technology-laden 
fields historically reserved for men (and when other more traditionally female 
professions, such as teaching, are increasingly mediated by technology), it is 
important to understand what texts that introduce women to the discourses of 
these fields convey about their subject positions as professionals. Posthuman 
ethics requires that gender identities be fluid prostheses available for adoption 
and dismissal, that cyborgs be allowed to enact “contradictory, partial, and 
strategic” identities (Haraway 74–75). The identity offered by this CD-ROM is 
about as far from the cyborg as possible. TPoP fails to heed Haraway’s call to 
dissolve the oppositions between human and animal and human and machine, 
and to imagine a complexly integrated, rather than simply fearful, relation 
between women and technology.  
When Pauline is faced with a seemingly insurmountable task, she reacts 
in predictable ways. She is unable to speak, often cries, and shuts her eyes. 
Carol, the protagonist of the video described earlier, “Powerful Presentation 
Skills,” is also often unable to speak, but her bodily reaction to stressful situations 
is often fainting. Ultimately, Pauline’s anxiety episodes end with a scream as she 
succumbs to a daydream in which she solves the problem through violence.  
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Silence is a common signifier for female passivity and lack of competence 
in public speaking, which are often constructed in binary form against male 
activity and ease in public speaking. As Cheryl Glenn has shown, the history of 
public speech is primarily of "vocal, virile, aristocratic males" (262). The 
depictions of Carol and Pauline’s reactions to anxiety in the form of crying and 
fainting perhaps owe much to Charcot’s clinical performances of hysteria at the 
Salpêtrière, where coached performances of hypnotized women convinced Freud 
and others of the “radical dissociative trends splitting the consciousness of 
hysterics, often in terms of socially commendable and socially censurable roles” 
(Bernheimer 7). The “success” and “failure” videos of the TPoP construct the split 
consciousness around these commendable and censurable roles. 
The split consciousness of Pauline often engages in fantasies of violence. 
In one such video episode, Pauline has been tasked with writing a business letter 
to a local bank requesting a loan. Instead of working, she files her nails instead. 
Conceivably, this could be read as an act of resistance (in the la perruque 
tradition of tactical resistance forwarded by Michel de Certeau) to speaking the 
language of business, but any notion of resistance is silenced by the voice-over 
provided by a Dick Tracy-like investigator, the "letter detective.” After a 
condescending opener referring to Pauline's nail-filing as "important business 
matters," this voice-over inscribes Pauline's refusal as incompetence rather than 
resistance, specifically as a failure to listen to advice from men.  
Pauline, unable to voice her intent in the language of business, instead 
dreams of getting the loan by holding the loan officer at gunpoint. Female 
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violence is here represented as emerging from an inability to communicate, in a 
manner I would argue is reminiscent to feminist interpretations of Freud's theory 
of hysteria in which the female body becomes the medium in which women 
communicate when other access to self-representation is denied to them. It is 
possible to see violence as a symptom of female incompetence, but also as the 
surplus of denied signification. What Hélène Cixous claims of Freud’s hysteric, 
Dora, may be also true of Pauline: she may be an “example of the protesting 
force of women” (Qtd. in Bernheimer 1). While female violence could be 
considered threatening (especially if emerging out of a coalition with other like-
minded individuals), TPoP presents it within a frame that reassures us that 
Pauline is alone and calmly filing her nails, not committing the violent act of which 
she can only daydream. That the advances of feminism are made safe in TPoP 
through the presentation of a solitary (hysteric) body is a strong argument for the 
critical importance of the distributed, networked body of posthumanism. 
 
Materiality in Theory  
The prominence of the body in posthumanism and the tendency to fall 
back into stereotypical narratives when representing the human body in new 
media texts suggests that theorists must become more aware of their relation to 
the material world. For many, theory is distinguished precisely by its abstract 
nature, by its opposition to the material. But this need not be so, not only in the 
case of Marxist theorists, but for all scholars. In Constructing Knowledges, Sid 
Dobrin relates the debates over the role of theory in composition studies, debates 
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centered most often on the relationship between theory and practice. Dobrin 
notes that the “direct impact” of this debate upon those who study writing comes 
from our twofold professional responsibility—“to participate in a practice, our 
pedagogy; and to produce theory that explains the nature, function, and 
operation of written discourse” (6). Thus, Dobrin suggests that our professional 
responsibilities as educators include a responsible commitment to material 
practices.  
In regards to our responsibility to produce theory, Dobrin, in the tradition of 
Richard Rorty and Stephen Toulmin, makes a distinction between theory with a 
small t—“an attempt to arrive at accurate explanations of some phenomena” by 
theorizing in ways that are “not necessarily rigid, didactic, or even stable”—and 
Theory with a big T—the attempt to produce “universal, generalizable grand 
explanations” that attain the status of unassailable law (Dobrin 8, 11). Dobrin 
rightly points out that many, while recognizing postmodern critics’ dismissal of the 
latter type of Theory, fail to recognize the value of theorizing as a process of 
inquiry that leads to “more useful explanations of phenomena for which past 
theories could not account” (9).  
Dobrin’s call for theorizing that produces useful explanations is something 
that posthumanists would definitely agree with. After all, posthumanists recognize 
that, to engage the complexity of machinic being, questions of how are more 
interesting, and less prone to metaphysical and ideological explanations than 
questions of why. In fact, Dobrin even defines theory as “the inference of how all 
like things operate based on repeated instances of observation, speculation 
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about those observations, and the construction of accurate explanations of what 
the phenomenon in question is and how it works” (8, emphasis added). Others 
might legitimately call this process “inductive reasoning,” and point out that much 
basic science, not just critical theory, happens in this manner. The following 
passage from Constructing Knowledges, however, demonstrates further how 
ideological explanations can subvert a more responsible engagement with 
materiality. Dobrin writes: 
Theory is often contrasted with law, as in the “law of physics.” . . . Of 
course, postmodern theory has put into question even the most 
sacrosanct absolute reliability of laws. For instance, a law of physics 
stipulates that water boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit; however, the boiling 
point of water is also dependent upon other variables, such as altitude. 
Context must always be considered. So even physical laws may not 
operate with the kind of absolute certainty once thought. (8) 
Dobrin’s attempt to justify the value of theorizing by displaying its ability to “put 
into question even the most sacrosanct absolute reliability of laws” falls short of a 
posthuman ethics that is responsible to the theoretical and to the material. The 
“Of course” that begins the declaration that postmodern theory has destabilized 
the foundation of law suggests that this example is not being presented to defend 
a questionable assertion. The following sentence beginning with “For instance” 
would then seem to provide unproblematic proof of postmodern theory’s ability to 
call into question absolute laws. But this example simply does not work 
historically or materially. For starters, the emergence of postmodern theory and 
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the revelation that the boiling temperature of water is not universal, but 
dependent upon several contextual variables, are separated by at least a 
century.  
In the 19th century, the work of scientists such as Dutch physicist 
Johannes Diderik Van der Waals and Irish chemist Thomas Andrews showed 
how boiling points were relative to the pressure of the substance, a phenomena 
leading to the pragmatic establishment of a standard pressure at which to define 
boiling points that could be compared. Even though scientists recognize that air 
pressure is variable from moment to moment, they agree to use what is called 
“standard pressure” as a representative measure of pressure at which to 
determine boiling points. Standard pressure is that found at sea level and is 
quantified as 1 atmosphere [atm] (often converted to kPa [kilopascals] for use in 
equations). But even the notion of sea level is misleading, since references to 
changes in altitude are really shorthand for changes in air pressure.  
The mathematical equivalent of the 212 degrees Fahrenheit that Dobrin 
mentions is 100 degrees Celsius. But technically the real boiling point of water is 
not 100 degrees Celsius at all, but 99.97 degrees. The multiple ways in which the 
boiling point of water is calculated has more to do with expectations about the 
audience of the texts in which these definitions rest. High school chemistry 
textbook authors, for instance, recognize that high school students typically 
cannot measure the difference between 99.97 and 100 degrees Celsius. Even 
among scientists, the exact temperature of 99.97 is not used. The International 
Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) makes a distinction between the 
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normal boiling point of water and the standard boiling point of water (“Notation” 
1247).  
The normal boiling point of water is indeed 99.97 degrees Celsius, which 
holds true at a standard pressure of 1 atm, which is equal to 101.325 kPa. But for 
ease of calculations, IUPAC has recommended since 1982 that scientists set the 
standard boiling point of water at 99.61 degrees Celsius, which holds true at the 
standard pressure of 1 bar, which is equal to the nice round number of 100 kPa. 
In this case, scientists have agreed to use a standardized number to represent 
the boiling point of water, one that is convenient for calculations rather than one 
that is beholden to nature. The choice here is a pragmatic one, not a dogmatic 
one. 
My point here is not to fault Dobrin for not knowing the true boiling point of 
water, but to show how scientists already, without the aid of postmodern theory, 
know that descriptions of the boiling point of liquid are only ever made relevant to 
a measurement of pressure (which is why all textbooks make reference to boiling 
points at standard pressure), and that they also accept the role of social 
convention upon scientific measurements, as evidenced in the IUPAC standards. 
When Dobrin says that “[c]ontext must always be considered,” he is not impelling 
scientists to do anything they do not already do (at least in the context of 
descriptions of water’s boiling point). If anything, Dobrin is ignoring the material 
contexts of scientific community and inquiry that have historically constrained the 
determination of water’s boiling point. Seemingly, he has ignored this context in 
order to argue for the value of postmodern theory. Instead, he has displayed the 
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exact type of overreaching that has allowed Frederick Crews and others to 
deflate the insights of postmodern theory.  
Dobrin has taken something that the scientific community knows is 
arbitrary and conventional, and suggests it is postmodern theory that allows us to 
see that it is arbitrary and conventional. In other words, Dobrin uses knowledge 
gained through science (the effect of altitude on air pressure and boiling points) 
to attempt to display the supposed shortcomings of science (its attempt to cast its 
findings as absolute laws). If theorists rely on the existence of absolute 
statements on which to practice their antifoundationalism, they may find few 
legitimate targets. If they insist on attacking notions that everyday practitioners 
recognize as being contextual and variable, as Dobrin does when he attacks the 
inexistent “law of physics” that states that water always boils at 212 degrees 
Fahrenheit, then they will appear, at best, naive, and, at worst, phony. 
These examples show how far theorists really must come in addressing 
the materiality of education. The claims we make for our theories and for our 
pedagogies must be responsible to the material and virtual worlds in which we 
live. Donna Haraway rightly notes that posthumanists typically eschew the use of 
binary formulations such as absolute/relative in order to justify the importance of 
their work because they realize that such either/or constructions fail to recognize 
the complexity of distributed embodiment and virtual positionality, and restricts 
the cyborg economy of “partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity” (71). In 
Posthuman Bodies, theorists Judith Halberstam and and Ira Livingston urge that 
educators must be prepared to engage posthuman bodies that are the “causes 
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and effects of postmodern relations of power and pleasure, virtuality and reality, 
sex and its consequences”; bodies that are at once “a technology, a screen, 
[and] a projected image” (3). As educators we must be faithful to any number of 
positions, ethical in our treatment of various components of the human machine, 
and always aware of the possible cultural and political consequences of the 
choices we make in the posthuman classroom.   
Theoretical discourse appropriate and responsive to these 
discursive/material/virtual bodies is perhaps just beginning to emerge, and with it, 
a new appreciation for the varied discourses at work in the modern university. As 
Hayles writes in “Interrogating the Posthuman Body,” the inability to parse both 
material and discursive approaches is “symptomatic of the divide that continues 
to separate scientific and technological disciplines on the one hand, which report 
their findings in the language of naive realism, and cultural and literary studies on 
the other, where discursive approaches are the order of the day” (755). 
Posthumanism represents an important opportunity for merging these scholarly 
approaches. To paraphrase Haraway, posthumanism is an argument for 
pleasure in the confusion of disciplinary boundaries and for responsibility in their 
construction (70). The following two chapters look at areas in which academic 
disciplines have embraced technologies that contain the potential to bridge the 
mental and physical divides transmitted through current disciplinary formations, 
and to bridge the perceived gulf between practical and theoretical approaches to 
education. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Posthuman Classrooms 
This chapter will consider the writing classroom as a possible point of 
contact between posthumanism and the academy. Specifically, it will look at the 
teaching of technical writing as a promising area in which to have students 
question the role of writing in the shaping of identity and in the maintenance of 
networked community. Technical documents promise to help us control the many 
anxieties associated with posthumanism; they promise to ease the everyday 
frustrations of modern life through technology (even if these problems are 
themselves introduced by technology). I am sure, for instance, that the SONY 
corporation spent good money to hire a team of technical writers to write the 
manual that came with my DVD player. I am sure, also, that my reading the 
manual should allow me to acquire the necessary skill to make my DVD player 
stop flashing “12:00,” as it has for the past several years. But ignoring such 
instruction is, as Nietzsche might say, all too human.  
While we do often encounter technical documents in the context of home 
technologies, the teaching of technical writing is most often set in the broader 
context of electronic literacy in the workplace (Sullivan and Dautermann). In other 
words, the common assumption is that learning to write technical documents is 
part of joining corporate culture. Thus, students tend to view technical writing as 
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a practical subject valuable to reaching their professional goals. This is related to 
the significance of the computer in, and the textual bias of, what is variously 
called the “information society, knowledge society, or network society” (Tynjala et 
al 74). 
But while it may be true, as former secretary of labor Robert Reich writes, 
that modern workers “when not conversing with their teammates . . . sit before 
computer terminals,” computers have also become central elements of non-work 
activities such as video gaming (208). The 2006 PS3 game system from Sony 
was promoted as a “supercomputer for computer entertainment” that could serve 
as the hub of a household’s multimedia needs, with about twenty times the 
computing power of the typical PC (Hermida). Increasingly, games are not 
restricted to the realm of leisure. At Dartmouth college, the installation of a 
campus-wide wireless network not only allows students to stay in constant 
communication, but allows teachers to integrate game show-type exercises into 
their courses which students participate in using their laptops. The U.S. military 
and many corporations now use games to train their employees cheaply and 
effectively, and to identify and attract potential employees.  
Despite the message sent by a number of reports from the National 
Commission on Writing showing that writing ability is a critical capacity for 
members of the academy, the workplace, and the government, technical writers 
get little respect in the modern world. In Writing a Professional Life, a collection 
of narratives written by working technical writers, we find that they are sometimes 
called “glorified typists” and managers and coworkers glibly dispense comments 
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such as “You can write standards, but no one is going to use them,” and “Don’t 
worry about it . . . Nobody reads manuals anyway” (Potts 24; Lee 46; Jong 124). 
Or technical writers are flatly told that “[d]ocumentation is a formality. Users don't 
read the documentation” (Staley 105). My own experiences as a technical writer 
aren’t much different. On many occasions, colleagues were politely dismissive 
towards my work, and in some cases, they were quite mean about the 
uselessness of my field.  Some years back, I did some grant writing for a mental 
health research institute. I worked next door to a very nice man whose job it was 
to collect statistics about suicides in the United States; even he told me that he 
thought my job wasn’t very pleasant and certainly not very useful.  
Popular culture isn’t kind to technical writers either. Tina the technical 
writer from the Dilbert comic strips is described as being so demeaned that she 
“believes that any conversation within hearing distance is intended as an insult to 
her profession and her gender. She strives to maintain her dignity while 
surrounded by engineers who don't have a proper respect for her work” (“The 
Characters”). Technical writers are often represented as an underclass of 
dehumanized laborers. 
 In the 2002 James Bond film, Die Another Day, Bond is handed a 
technical manual for his new tricked-out spy car. After being told by Q, the 
gadget master, that he could probably “shoot through [the manual] in a couple of 
hours,” Bond immediately throws the manual into the sights of the car’s target-
seeking shotguns, which promptly convert the manual into a shower of paper 
scraps.  
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There is hope for technical writers outside of comic strips and international 
spying in the fast-developing realm of gaming. In the context of online gaming, 
technical writing is the lingua franca of achievement and admiration. The 
distributed communities of online games use technical writing to establish a 
sense of community, and community members use technical writing to establish 
their positions within these groups. In such a setting, cyborgs are welcome; their 
“[i]ntense pleasure in skill, machine skill, ceases to be a sin, but an aspect of 
embodiment” (Haraway 83). The chapter below will explore how video games 
and the composition of technical documents provide insight into the construction 
of posthuman community.  
 
Gaming the Classroom 
Can video games be integrated into technical writing classes? The easy 
answer is: of course, it is entirely possible to have students compose traditional 
technical genres that focus on video games. Certainly, students could write 
proposals for new games, compose recommendation reports on which recently 
released games to buy, create white papers on legal or ethical issues concerning 
video games, generate informational reports on technical topics related to 
gaming hardware and software, and assemble user documentation that covers 
subjects such as game installation, mechanics, or strategy. Assigning user 
documentation is eased by the abundance of Flash-based games on the web 
and the distribution of gamer-created content for mainstream games, both of 
which present freely accessible gaming material that is often not well-
 71 
documented. New games and steady changes in underlying technologies provide 
an extensive source of technical information in need of analysis and description, 
and the constant influx of new gamers supplies writers with an interested 
audience that, if past trends continue, will only grow. 
The promise of video games in the classroom is not that they can deliver 
traditional content in digital packaging.  Treating video games simply as the 
potential content of technical writing ignores the experiences of gamers, in the 
words of James Paul Gee in What Video Games Have to Teach Us About 
Learning and Literacy, as cyborg “learners (players) embedded in a material and 
social world” (7). 
Kurt Squire argues that using video games is more than an opportunity to 
update the delivery of traditional material.  Rather, video games can offer 
“designed experiences, in which participants learn through a grammar of doing 
and being” (19). Video games that allow students to learn through “doing and 
being,” as Shaffer, Squire, Halverson, & Gee suggest in their collaborative article, 
ideally combine the best of educational theory and praxis, engaging players in 
activities that help them “learn by integrating thinking, social interaction, and 
technology, all in service of doing things they care about” (3). Those interested in 
games and education, including those interested in making video games a part of 
technical writing curricula, must therefore shift from the “question of ‘delivering 
content’ to one of ‘designing experience’” (Squire 20). So, does this mean that 
technical writing instructors must await the appearance of a technical writing 
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simulation? Not at all. Current video games already provide situations in which 
being a successful gamer entails doing technical writing.2  
Educators are now beginning to realize the potential for sophisticated 
learning within the social contexts of video games due not only to an 
epistemological correspondence between technical writing and video games, but 
because the experience of being a gamer always goes beyond the screen, 
engaging individuals in social practices mediated by texts that are predominantly 
written by gamers themselves. Viewing technical writing as a social practice is 
not a new idea. Teachers of technical writing have long turned toward the 
workplace to provide the social contexts in which the production of technical 
genres can be studied, and to provide the cases through which technical writing 
is often taught. The posthuman classroom is, ironically, not necessarily within the 
institution at all. The networking common to the posthuman makes it possible for 
learning to occur in many locations, and with varying degrees of intervention by 
teachers and peers. We will therefore look to the practices of gaming 
communities, in particular the experiences of those gamers involved in the 
persistent three-dimensional online environments known as MMORPGs 
(massively multiplayer online role-playing games) to understand how video 
games call upon gamers to become posthuman technical writers. 
 
Writing as Gaming 
Some have already tried to imagine how new video games might be 
designed to teach writing directly. As part of their September 2006 issue, 
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Harper’s Magazine arranged a discussion among “four experts—two video-game 
enthusiasts and two teachers—and charged them with a task: to dream up video 
games that might teach, of all things, writing” (“Grand” 31).3 The impetus for such 
a meeting was sound; while many pedagogical projects in fields such as 
engineering, history, biology, architecture, and medicine have successfully 
integrated video games into curricula, the teaching of writing through video 
games has yet to be seriously pursued. In order to harness the educational 
potential in video games for the teaching of writing, such conversations need to 
occur between game designers and educators, and Harper’s can be commended 
for initiating such a discussion. But from the perspective of someone interested in 
the teaching of technical writing as a social practice, the results of the 
conversation published in Harper’s are disappointing. 
The group began by discussing the possibility of using video games to 
teach the “rote elements of writing—grammar, punctuation, and spelling,” and 
later to teach the “logical, consequential thinking” of argument, narrative 
emplotment, and the development of literary characters (“Grand” 32). In the 
games these individuals imagine, players shoot zombies bearing misspelled 
words, manage a narrative in a literary version of SimCity, and write in a wiki (an 
online collaborative writing space). None of these suggestions address writing as 
a practice situated in communities (or even as part of a rhetorical situation). In 
fact, only the wiki idea includes interaction with other individuals as part of the 
process at all, but in this case the interaction is a function of the technology 
rather than part of the purposes or motives of those using it.  
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Such approaches, in which students write to no person for no reason, hold 
little credence in modern composition theory and pedagogy. Having reduced 
writing instruction to the teaching of a set of narrow skills, it’s no wonder one of 
the speakers in the Harper’s group doubts whether such lessons will be useful in 
“the real world” (“Grand” 34, 35). For their model to succeed, these skills must 
transfer to real writing situations, but real writing situations are never imagined as 
sites of education. Such a proposal refuses to take advantage of the posthuman 
networks in which gamers and gaming discourse already circulate. It projects the 
model of the academic classroom (and its purposeless writing) into cyberspace 
without considering the very real writing that might be coming out of cyberspace.  
The only reference to a real situation is when one of the teachers, Jane 
Avrich, wonders whether a game could “include real reading,” for instance, by 
having players “read literary texts and answer questions about them” (“Grand” 
38). In this game (which sounds a lot like a reading quiz), answering increasingly 
difficult questions would, Avrich claims, produce “[t]he text, a unique story 
determined by the player, [which] would ultimately lead you to the goal of your 
quest: the secret scrolls of Atlantis, for example, or the buried wing of the library 
of Alexandria.” Another speaker generously calls this proposed game “an 
exercise in a form of literacy.” One might legitimately ask here: where’s the 
writing? Playing this game produces a text only insofar as it embodies the tenet 
of reader response theory in which every act of reading produces the text being 
read.  
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Granted, the fusion of reading and writing is a feature that early theorists 
of hypertext such as George Landow found especially provocative, and such 
technologies help us acknowledge the indeterminate nature of texts as social 
artifacts. But the belief that navigating hypertext (or answering questions about 
literary texts) equals instruction in writing is difficult to reconcile to the awareness 
that “language and texts . . . are essentially social activities, dependent on social 
structures and processes not only in their interpretive but also in their 
constructive phases” (Cooper 366). In order to understand the role of technical 
writing in gaming communities, it makes sense to turn towards an approach to 
writing that recognizes the construction of texts as a complex social process: 
activity theory. 
Activity theory draws upon the work of such theorists as Charles 
Bazerman, Paul Prior, and David Russell, to investigate how texts and textual 
practices are (re)produced in social settings. Based on the psychological theories 
of Lev Vygotsky, activity theory looks at writing as always occurring within 
“activity systems”—the complex ecologies of meaning and method sustained by 
communities of practice. These systems are composed of “goal-directed, 
historically-situated, cooperative human interactions” within communities where 
writing processes constitute a “complex literate activity that includes reading and 
writing, feeling and thinking, speaking and listening, observing and acting” 
(Russell, “Implications” 53; Bazerman and Prior 7).  
The move towards posthumanism has only deepened the complexities of 
these writing communities. Grounding writing instruction in activity theory calls on 
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students to understand writing through the “practices that people engage in to 
produce texts as well as the ways that writing practices gain their meanings and 
functions as dynamic elements of specific cultural settings” (Bazerman and Prior 
2). Thus, when the Harper’s speaker suggests a video game based on the 
“difficult, detailed, and arcane” minutiae of literary analysis, it is possible to see 
this as trying to create a game that engages players in some of the communal 
practices centered on the recurring situations experienced within a certain activity 
system—that which includes English professors. For this community, “everything 
from the basic rules of grammar to the obscure etymology of words” serves as 
some of the tools employed in certain types of academic writing (“Grand” 38).  
But activity theorists maintain that writing as a member of a community 
must necessarily be more than the interaction between an individual and an 
object of study using prescribed and approved methods. It requires engagement 
with other community members; “organizations as well as individuals have writing 
processes,” and it is only within these communal practices that one can see “how 
writing works and [how] people work with writing” (Russell, “Process” 81). The 
Harper’s literary-reading game could become a game about writing if it enabled 
interaction among new and experienced players, for instance, in the form of 
discussion and debate over the interpretive choices being made, the methods 
enacted to reach those interpretations, and even the very rules of the game. This 
would situate the desired literary reading techniques within the social context of a 
community of practice. Whether gamers would find this enjoyable, however, is 
another issue.  
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Texting a Quest 
King’s Quest, a long-running series of graphic adventure games published 
by Sierra Online, places the gamer in the role of Sir Graham—knight, hero, and, 
by the second game, king. But another role that players of these games adopt is 
that of technical writer. The first installment of King’s Quest was released in 1984 
for the IBM PCjr computer system. It was the first 3-dimensional computer game 
where the player controlled a character on the screen in third-person mode. 
Moving this character was accomplished using the keypad, and actions were 
performed by typing simple commands, such as “eat mushroom” or “open door” 
into an on-screen text box.  
In a sense, gamers playing King’s Quest I learned to write the short, 
imperative sentences common to technical documents such as instructions, and 
each time they hit “enter” after typing an instruction, a usability test of their 
instruction was played out on the screen in front of them—if their instruction was 
successful, their character took the desired action.  While such indirect education 
was common, the documentation that came with these games sometimes took 
encouragement of technical writing a step further. The majority of the King’s 
Quest II manual was concerned with the background narrative of the player’s 
character and the fictional kingdom of Daventry, and the island of Kolyma on 
which the player finds herself at the beginning of the game. But two pages spoke 
directly to the reader as gamer. The first page gave general advice such as 
“leave no stone unturned” and “collect as many treasures as you can” (Sierra 
10). The next page contained the following text: 
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MAP YOUR PROGRESS 
You and King Graham will not be able to fulfill the prophecy without 
mapping your progress. Draw a map showing what different directions 
lead where, objects found, dangerous areas—any and every landmark 
you see along the way. And don’t think that because you’ve been through 
an area once, that it will always be the same. The population of Kolyma is 
anything but stationary.  
Here’s a typical map: 
 [flowchart-style map of connected ovals with text annotations] 
Above all, try every direction and map all of the different possibilities. If 
you miss or forget an area, you might miss an important clue or a tool 
necessary to the completion of your quest. (Sierra 11) 
Here, the gamer is encouraged to become a maker of maps, a genre that is 
mostly ignored in technical writing textbooks, but which is highly valued in 
gaming communities. In fact, one young gamer took this encouragement 
seriously. Below is a map created while playing King’s Quest II:  
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Figure 1. Gamer-produced map for King’s Quest II. (Mason “Map”) 
 
This map does not look much like the example provided in the manual, which is a 
flowchart with text-filled ovals connected by lines and arrows, with no 
representative graphics. It is quite possible that the flowchart-style map shown in 
the King’s Quest manual fit the practices of the communities with which the game 
designers were familiar—that of the business world, for instance—or the 
practices of the community from which the game emerged—that of the game 
designer(s) laying out a world whose visual appearance and topography were 
still in the process of being imagined.4 The designers could build this world by 
naming the locations and, literally, drawing the connections between the various 
scenes. Their map would include no graphics because such details would be 
decided later in the process, quite possibly by other individuals. 
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The map above, on the other hand, emerged from the author’s experience 
as a solitary gamer moving from screen to screen in a world already fully 
illustrated. It is hard to see, at first, how such a map produced for personal use in 
playing a non-collaborative game could point to the posthuman. After all, the 
game designers took as their model of perception the human being, providing a 
ground-level view of the digital world, a choice reproduced in the third-person 
perspective of the map’s graphics (as opposed to the straight-down aerial 
perspective, or the “bird’s-eye” view, of conventional maps).  
Laurie Taylor has claimed that video games are “experiential spaces 
generated through code and the player’s interaction with the execution of that 
code through the medium of the screen” (“When” para. 1). The design of the map 
above does draw attention to the “medium of the screen,” as it is formatted in a 
grid, much like a series of individual screenshots. But it is important to note that 
the character that the gamer played in this game (Sir Graham) never adopted 
this perspective himself; rather, he walked across the screen as an avatar under 
the player’s command, without his own three-dimensional perspective (which had 
been available in video games since the mid-1970s). Already, we can see that 
the representation of space in the game is at once impossible without the user 
entering into a cognitive circuit with the screen in which what is seen is seen from 
the gamer’s perspective. 
The design choices are not merely personal, however. The map’s visual 
conventions reinforce the importance of the goal provided by the manual to 
“collect as many treasures as you can”: the name of every treasure on the map is 
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enclosed in its own rectangular box. While the author’s map attests to the fact 
that the medium of the screen is just one element in a broader context of literacy 
activities invoked through the playing of games, it is important to remember that 
this map was produced for personal use, with the limited goal of completing the 
game, and so did not enter into the discourse of a broader gaming community. 
Modern MMORPGs are built around communities of gamers that produce and 
share such documents, and therefore these documents will be subject to the 
standards and purposes of the communities from which they emerge, purposes 
much more diverse than simply “the completion of your quest.” A short list of the 
genres that gamers value and/or produce includes the following: 
• Guidebooks – depending on the game and purpose, may focus on 
combat strategy, level advancement, trade skills, or other non-combat 
activities such as group management or conflict resolution 
• Technical Descriptions – of in-game items/quests/characters; often 
found in online databases of game information; especially valued when 
describing a new discovery 
• Policies – written to manage the recurring action of social groups, such 
as how one becomes a member of a specific gaming guild, or how loot is 
divided among group members 
• Forums – online discussion boards on which players debate issues, post 
announcements, and coordinate with other gamers; increasingly, game 
developers often track user opinions via forums or solicit suggestions 
directly 
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• Tutorials – instructions on how to accomplish various in-game tasks; 
often text-based, accompanied by screenshots, although some online 
sites host tutorials gamers have created by taking screen movies of 
themselves performing specific actions within the game combined with 
an instructional voice-over 
• FAQs – Frequently Asked Questions sections are staples of online sites 
providing introductory information to novice players 
• Screenshots – gamers often compose screenshots to prove that they 
have reached a special destination in a game, defeated a specific 
opponent, or otherwise to commemorate in-game events; it is also 
common for online communities to gather for in-game group photos that 
would be difficult to coordinate face-to-face  
• Maps – portraying a range of sites and phenomena; many MMORPGs 
take place in vast worlds that are difficult for new players to navigate, 
and in which the geographic resources and dangers are not obvious  
• Reviews – of new games or game expansions, or in response to 
changes made in the underlying game code 
• Walkthroughs – step-by-step procedures for completing a game; more 
commonly created for linear games with definite end points than for 
open-ended MMORPGs 
• End User Licensing Agreements – contracts that define the user’s legal 
rights within the commercial game5  
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• Mods – user-created modifications of the game; in some games, these 
could be anything from new boards to objects, avatars, skins (new 
graphics overlaid onto pre-existing game objects), or updates to the 
game engine itself 
Narrative makes no explicit appearance above. But it is important to remember, 
as John Seely Brown has explained in his article, “Growing Up Digital,” that 
technical communities (in Seely’s article, tech reps for Xerox) depend heavily on 
storytelling to supplement or even replace traditional technical documents such 
as manuals as sources of technical information.6 There’s no reason to believe 
that the stories shared by gamers in-game and in online forums do not perform 
similar functions. This list does not attempt to address all the different texts that 
gamers produce, nor does it attempt to investigate how the value of these real-
world documents may be related to the in-game roles of texts as valuable game 
objectives and equipment (recall the suggestion in Harper’s that gamers might 
seek “the secret scrolls of Atlantis, or the buried wing of the library of 
Alexandria”).7 What this list does provide is a sense of the range of both 
traditional and hybrid genres that gamers employ to mediate their social gaming 
activities. While some gamers make use of insider information about games 
provided by other players, referring to them as cheats, this is just one of the 
ethical issues raised by the posthuman characteristics of distributed cognition, in 
which it is easy to find out what other gamers already know. 
While students don’t often associate writing with play, it’s also true that 
many gamers come to see their play as work. As Nick Yee concludes, “many 
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players in fact characterize their game play as a second job,” repeating within the 
game the same types of “clerical tasks, logistical planning, and management” 
activities that they perform at work (69). It’s unsurprising, then, to find that the 
writing genres that gamers create in the process of playing games are 
comparable to those found in other technical communities. For activity theorists, 
genre is a key concept in writing instruction because genres embody the 
standard forms and processes of communication within a community of practice.  
They are the “recognizable, self-reinforcing forms of communication” that 
emerge to address the shared common purposes and situations that members of 
a community often face (Bazerman, “Speech” 316). Without these shared and 
recurring experiences and the genres that emerge to address them, there is no 
need for enculturation in communal writing practices. And if, as Bazerman 
argues, genres of writing are “continuing realizations of social activity within 
socially structured situations,” that is, if they always carry the mark of their 
“historical, social moment,” then teachers should be able to use the writing of 
gamers within gaming communities to provide students insight into the 
contemporary practices of technical communication (Shaping 128, emphasis 
added, 5). 
 
Guilding the Writer 
“‘Experience,’ said Holmes, laughing. ‘Indirectly it may be of value, you know; 
you have only to put it into words to gain the reputation of being excellent 
company for the remainder of your existence.’” 
– Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Adventures of Sherlock Holmes 
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Tom Malone has shown how games tap into players’ curiosity, fantasy, 
and need for challenge and control to create what he calls “intrinsically 
motivating” environments (333). The role of motivation in getting humans to 
produce discourse is not an afterthought in posthumanism, as Deleuze’s and 
Guattari’s use of “desiring machines” evidences. Arguably, players in MMORPG 
environments, by plugging into the machine that is the game, are motivated to 
collaborate. As Brad McQuaid, one of the designers of the game EverQuest (EQ) 
has stated, “By creating an environment often too challenging for a solo player, 
people are compelled to group and even to form large guilds and alliances. All of 
this builds community, and it all keeps players coming back for more and more” 
(Qtd. in Jakobsson and Taylor 88).  
By becoming members of a guild, players stake their position as nodes in 
a virtual network of knowledge. They contribute to the larger success of their 
guild through the accumulation of group capital, even as they advance as 
individuals. This play of plurality and singularity makes every guild to be a 
multitude in the sense forwarded by Hardt and Negri. The ability of players to 
switch among multiple avatars, each with distinct possessions and abilities 
makes these “whatever” communities in the sense forwarded by Agamben. 
Bodies are not devalued, however. As anyone who’s played EQ knows, one’s 
body in the game is a valuable commodity. Dying strands your body, often in 
inconvenient places, and a player must often enlist the help of others to reclaim it 
before it disappears from the game, taking with the all the functionality and 
capital embedded in the prostheses it was carrying at the time of death. 
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The collaborative nature of such game play is not only necessary for the 
accumulation of material capital embodied in durable commodities that can be 
traded both in and outside the game (in-game currency, or components for 
crafting items in-game, for example), it also facilitates the accumulation of the 
various social and cultural capital that gamers create through their participation in 
social networks. Thomas Malaby has explored the many types of capital that 
gamers generate, working from Pierre Bourdieu’s account of the “economy of 
practices” in order to show how “human practice over time accumulates in 
different forms . . . the congealed labor of commodities, the lasting obligations of 
social networks, or the established cultural practices of taste” (147). What Malaby 
does not address is the role that writing serves in the production of this capital. 
Sherlock Holmes had Watson, his faithful chronicler, to put his exploits 
into words. Gamers have themselves. Social capital is a valuable resource in 
MMORPGs, especially as gamers join groups (known as “guilds” in EQ) and 
advance to higher levels. As Jakobsson and Taylor write, “a character might be 
quite powerful in terms of experience level, [but] they also need social capital to 
draw on to progress to the true high-end game” (86). They further state that 
guilds, by solving previously unsolved puzzles, or figuring out how to defeat 
difficult new creatures, are able to “actually contribute to the broader collective 
knowledge of the game.” Guilds thus qualify as a “pool of people eligible for 
rewards accruing from the production” of knowledge about the game world they 
inhabit (Longo 2). As Bernadette Longo explains in her book, Spurious Coin: A 
History of Science, Management, and Technical Writing, “technical writing is the 
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apparatus for assigning credit and value” for the production of such knowledge 
(2). By becoming technical writers, gamers are able to manage their 
accumulation of social capital.  
Jakobsson and Taylor also claim that although gamers are “creators of 
their gaming experience. . . . there is actually very little freedom for any given 
player to affect the larger social structure” and thus the “specific contribution of 
any single player is almost never visible” (89). While this may be true in terms of 
changes made to the overall social structure of the game, it does not apply to the 
production of knowledge about these games at the micro-level, the majority of 
which is credited to the individuals who collect and publish such information. 
There are many online sites that enable gamers to gain credit by sharing the 
knowledge they have accumulated through play. The web site Allakhazam's 
Magical Realm (everquest.allakhazam.com), for instance, is an online database 
of information about EQ. All of the information about the gaming worlds is 
attributed to the individual gamers who submit it, who gain the title of “scholar,” 
“sage” or “guru” for their unpaid efforts. 
Let’s consider a gamer known online as Friedrich Psitalon, a contributor to 
Allakhazam's Magical Realm and sites like it. Friedrich frequently uploaded 
images and descriptions of items to online databases like Allakhazam’s Magical 
Realm, but these were not Friedrich’s only venue for spreading technical 
knowledge about the game. At the time, Friedrich was guild master of the Povar-
Tarew Artisans (PTA), an EQ guild dedicated to the mastery of trades (in EQ, 
players can practice a trade, becoming, for instance, a tailor, smith, cook, 
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jeweler, or alchemist). The PTA created a web site to manage their guild, a place 
where anyone could access the collective wisdom of their guild members.8 Their 
site hosted a “library” containing such documents as “Sojiba's Guide to Potions,” 
“Wrin's Guide to Baking,” “Yoan's Guide to Brewing,” “Doompety's Guide to 
Tinkering,” and “Friedrich’s Guide to Making Things That Shine” (i.e. jewelry)—all 
technical documents written by guild members and attributed to them using their 
in-game character names. The site also contained documents intended to 
mediate guild activities such as news and announcements, their guild charter, a 
code of ethics, policies for advancing within the guild, and rules for conducting 
guild activities such as the in-game bazaars where they sold their crafts. Overall, 
the guild used technical documents to sustain and organize their online 
community, as well as gain prestige in the eyes of other gamers by sharing their 
collective knowledge.  
Through his guild membership and community participation both in and 
out of the game, Friedrich maintained a reputation as one of those individuals 
who “know the [community’s] specialized language and can turn this knowledge 
into specialized practices,” thus becoming “eligible for the power, influence, and 
funding that accrue from this knowledge” (Longo 3). Some evidence of the 
usefulness of such capital is that Friedrich was able to parlay his experience as 
an EQ guild master, as an active contributor to online gaming forums, and as an 
amateur competitive gamer into a position as a production assistant for Firaxis 
Games. Firaxis Games is a video game development company best known for its 
Civilization games, a series of award-winning historical simulation and strategy 
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games in which you build an empire through ancient times to the modern age 
and beyond.  
Once established as an in-house authority, Friedrich was asked to co-
author (under his real name) the Brady Games official strategy guide for the most 
recent Civilization game. Such translations of “experience in the virtual world into 
success in the real one,” Brown and Thomas write, are “bound to become more 
common as the gaming audience explodes and gameplay becomes more 
sophisticated.” They call such educational experiences “accidental learning” that 
favors “learning to be—a natural byproduct of adjusting to a new culture—as 
opposed to learning about.” While many are willing to admit the considerable 
amount of learning that takes place in gaming, and the importance of networking 
in the development of marketable skills, the role that writing plays in such 
experiential learning remains largely unrecognized. 
 
Gaming as Productive Social Practice 
At a time when online gaming industry revenues are overshadowing more 
traditional entertainment options, when corporate, military, and private interests 
are actively pursuing their agendas through the development of interactive 
games, and when both children and adults are spending an increasing amount of 
their lives developing online identities and interacting socially with other gamers, 
it is unsurprising to learn that a host of academic and non-academic initiatives, 
centers, groups, and conferences has emerged to understand (and influence) 
how games affect literacy and learning. For instance, in a 2004 white paper 
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entitled “Video Games and the Future of Learning,” educators from the University 
of Wisconsin-Madison’s Academic Advanced Distributed Learning Co-Laboratory 
argued that video games “have the potential to change the landscape of 
education as we know it,” because they are “not just about facts or isolated skills, 
but embody particular social practices” (Shaffer et al. 2).  
I’d like to think that it is not such a revolutionary idea that education is “not 
just about facts or isolated skills.” At the least, I don’t believe such an insight will 
revolutionize the teaching of writing. Over half a century ago, in his 1953 
dissertation, Albert Kitzhaber called on teachers to stop teaching writing through 
the “modes” (traditionally defined as narration, description, exposition and 
argument) which he believed provided an “unrealistic view of the writing process” 
and, rather, to understand writing as a “meaningful act of communication in a 
social context” (139, emphasis added). Almost a quarter century ago, Marilyn 
Cooper proposed an “ecological model of writing, whose fundamental tenet is 
that writing is an activity through which a person is continually engaged with a 
variety of socially constituted systems” (367). She was building on the work of 
previous scholars who had resisted the view of writing as merely a set of 
cognitive processes, scholars who had concluded instead that writing “cannot be 
artificially separated from the social-rhetorical situations in which writing gets 
done, from the conditions that enable writers to do what they do, and from the 
motives writers have for doing what they do” (Qtd. in Cooper 367). Today, the 
role of the social in writing practices is considered fundamental to writing 
instruction.  
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With a strong record of understanding writing through social ecologies, 
writing teachers are well prepared to understand the role of language and writing 
in the dynamic, free-form interactions that characterize modern MMORPGs, to 
take advantage of the access that the Internet provides to the documents of 
online gaming communities, and to perceive how the in-game and out-of-game 
activities of these communities constitute “dynamic interlocking systems which 
structure the social activity of writing” (Cooper 368). Such work can illuminate the 
contours of posthuman learning and challenge the “axiomatic assumption that 
games are by definition ‘unproductive,’” by drawing attention to the texts 
produced by gamers to mediate social interactions (Pearce 17). If it is true that 
the production and circulation of technical genres is a feature of successful 
gaming communities, then participation in these games is one way to offer 
students access to a social context in which technical writing matters. 
When video games first emerged, their simplicity carried over to their 
instructions. Pong, the first coin-op arcade game to gain widespread attention, 
simply stated “Avoid missing ball for high score” (Cohen 37). For other early 
games, game developers could produce short manuals that included descriptions 
of all the characters, locations, and items that a player would encounter while 
playing the game. But with MMORPGs such as EQ boasting over 50,000 unique 
items, and constantly adding them, it’s easy to see why manuals for these games 
would avoid the traditional role of describing game content. The scale of modern 
video games thus produces an environment that encourages the types of activity 
pointed out by Raph Koster, a video game designer speaking in the Harper’s 
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forum, when he noted that “Lots of players have written their own game guides” 
(“Grand” 34).  
The open-ended nature of MMORPGs and the socially-constructed norms 
of gaming communities ensure that “there is a wide gap between how the game 
is described through the official channels, such as in the manual, and how it is 
actually played” (Jakobsson and Taylor 89). The technical genres created by 
gamers serve as what Carolyn Miller has called “genres of social action”—genres 
that reveal the “typified rhetorical actions based in [the] recurrent situations” that 
members of a community face (159).9 The manuals created by game 
development companies typically do not address these recurrent situations, a 
circumstance that leads gamers to produce their own texts. While it may be true, 
as one gamer writes, that “most gamers (including me) prefer to skip the guide, 
install the game, and learn by doing,” this dismissal of guidebooks is usually 
limited only to official game manuals that are packaged with the game when you 
buy it (Jimpy). 
That MMORPGs are “fairly free-form, without any specific goal that you 
have to reach” turns the games into a process of discovery in which the gamer 
must explore the world, collect information, investigate possibilities, and engage 
in problem-solving to advance, often with the help of other gamers (“Grand” 34). 
As they gain expertise about the game world and how to succeed in it, players 
can create “guides [that] synthesize all that knowledge, translate it into prose, 
make it intelligible to other people” (“Grand” 35). Such guides are found not only 
freely distributed, but for sale as well. It is telling that one of the Harper’s 
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speakers responds to the suggestion that gamers could create game guides by 
asking whether gamers would be “able to abstract this knowledge out of the 
gaming world and into the real world?” What this speaker fails to see is that, in 
producing these guides for consumption by other players, gamers have already 
abstracted knowledge out of the gaming world into the real world using the skills 
it takes to write, organize, and, sometimes, to market their texts. In truth, active 
participation in gaming communities demands proficiency in “a range of (primarily 
written) social practices, eliciting an enormous amount of reading, writing, 
research, and argumentation,” the very skills the Harper’s group appears to be 
interested in (Squire 23).  
That gamers are willing to put great effort into the production of texts that 
they then distribute outside of the games they play should not be surprising. As 
Bazerman has recognized, the learning, attention, and development of 
individuals are “closely tied to what they find (or can be convinced is) real and 
engaging, even if at certain moments play is what strikes them as most real” 
(“Editor’s” ix). Posthumanism dissolves the boundaries between the real and the 
virtual, between the simulation and the simulated. Certainly, the fact that some 
individuals have made careers out of playing video games (both as competitive 
players and as online merchants selling in-game items for actual money) 
suggests that there is more reality here than often presumed.10  
Though often devalued as mere play, video games are significant sites of 
literacy. In a study of the literacy activities of preadolescent African American 
males interested in basketball, Jabari Mahiri noted that these youth, though 
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selective in their reading interests, “eagerly devoured 20- to 30-page video game 
manuals describing the rules and strategies for playing computer basketball and 
other computer sports games” (310). Part of the educational value of video 
gaming comes from how motivated gamers are to become successful members 
in gaming communities. In some cases, such occasions lead to an individual’s 
first serious engagement with technical genres, or with activities common in 
technical communities such as usability testing.11 
The link between video games, learning, and technical communication 
rests partly on a common epistemology. The traditional goals of technical 
communication are, as Mike Markel has written, to help readers “learn something 
or carry out a task” (5). The basic assumption is that readers of technical writing 
primarily read for the purpose of enabling a specific action. After all, few people 
peruse a phonebook just for fun. Technical genres are thus often viewed as 
“functional documents” that focus on a “human agent performing actions in a 
particularized situation” (Flower, Hayes, and Swarts 42). Squire has argued that 
video games are designed according to a “functional epistemology . . . [where 
the] player’s actions are his or her interface with the world” (22).  
Whether casting spells, swinging swords, drinking potions, or practicing 
trade skills, players of EQ survive and advance through their in-game actions. 
Surely, players are motivated by the desire for fun; but in order to have fun in the 
game, players must acquire the technical knowledge necessary to perform 
actions successfully in the game world. These actions are the “building blocks by 
which players become action heroes, civilization leaders, or L.A. gangsters” 
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(Squire 22). This “grammar of doing and being” within video games parallels the 
functional epistemology of technical writing (Squire 19). Since most MMORPGs 
reward players for continued play by granting them new abilities, it is easy to see 
how gamers can conflate fun with the ability to do (more and better) things.12 
Gamers also reinforce the functional link between technical documents 
and video games by viewing these documents as tools that enable future action 
in the game by providing accurate information. Such attitudes position the 
“technical writer in a quite orthodox, classical world” where writing “functions best 
when it functions as a conduit for verifiable, technical information” (Neel 23). As 
one online gaming site promises, “we try our best to keep the information here as 
accurate and up to date as possible” (“About EQTC”). But many scholars have 
shown how technical writing is anything but “a transparent conveyor of neutral, 
objective facts” with accuracy as its sole measure (Bushnell 179). So, the above 
should not be taken as an argument that technical documents created by gamers 
are, or should be, merely functional documents. Technical writing is entirely 
rhetorical, and its production is shot through with ethical and political issues 
attendant to the social construction of meaning through language.  
The recognition of the functional relationship between video games and 
technical writing shouldn’t be allowed to undermine the critical aims of socially-
based pedagogies. Educators can encourage students to look closely at the 
social activities of gaming communities (and not just the game itself) in order to 
understand how technical writing participates in what Longo calls “historically 
situated institutions of relationships of knowledge and power—how some types of 
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knowledge are valued and legitimated through technical writing practices, while 
other possible knowledges are devalued or excluded as marginal” (12). Without 
such inquiry, technical writing is reduced to its positivistic and functional aspects. 
But without the close attention to the social interactions of communities that 
approaches such as activity theory call for, including recognition of the functional 
objectives of many gamers, such inquiry is impossible.  
 
Writing(:) the Future of Video Games in Education 
“But will computers change the way we learn? We answer: Yes. 
Computers are already changing the way we learn—and if you want to 
understand how, look at video games. Look at video games, . . . . 
Look at video games . . . . Look at video games . . . .”  
–Shaffer et al., “Video Games and the Future of Learning”  
 
Video games are a convenient touchstone for the changing nature of 
education. Already, university classes are being held, not just online, but within 
online gaming worlds such as Second Life—a three-dimensional virtual world in 
which “residents” have near-unlimited control, not just over the appearance of 
their avatars, but over the mechanics of the game world itself. Online sites such 
as the Apolyton University have emerged to satisfy gamers’ need for advanced 
instruction in gameplay. Accredited bricks-and-mortar institutions such as the 
DigiPen Institute of Technology now offer degrees in Real-Time Interactive 
Simulation.13 The epigraph above repeatedly calls upon us to “look at video 
games” as the site of understanding the potential of computer-mediated learning. 
In order to understand the role of video games in learning, in particular the 
learning of writing, we need to look beyond the games themselves to the 
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activities of gaming communities, and to the documents that circulate throughout 
the social contexts beyond the screen, and to these texts’ relation to the political 
and ethical commitments of gamers within these communities. 
With their long-term commitment to the “central role that communities play 
in both writing and writing pedagogy,” writing teachers are well-positioned to take 
advantage of the experiences that video games offer to facilitate writing 
instruction. (Thralls and Blyler 250). If one accepts David Russell’s decree that 
“All learning is situated within some activity system(s). One learns by 
participating—directly or vicariously” in these system(s), then perhaps students 
can learn technical writing through participation in the activity systems constituted 
by video gaming (“Implications” 56). By looking at the activity systems in which 
gamers write, we can better understand the practices and genres which form the 
basis of gamers’ communicative practice, and we can also establish the 
educational value of existing video games. 
Such work recognizes that the networked classroom is not just a 
classroom connected to the internet by wires, but a circuit made through bodies, 
intentions, and affects. Taking our place as machines in the posthuman 
university need not entail, and posthuman education does not necessarily mean 
holding a class inside of virtual spaces such as Second Life. What matters is 
critical attention to the way that education happens through our connections with 
others by the virtue of our embodiment within networks of communication and 
collaboration. 
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Chapter 4 
Posthuman Institutions 
 Much of the focus on posthumanism has been on its more technologized 
features.  Perhaps this is because non-human prosthesis are the most visible 
and exciting characteristics of the posthuman age.  Even more notable than the 
visibility and excitement of technology, however, is the anxiety it brings.  While it 
is likely that the greatest anxiety is present in those individuals who have the 
least familiarity with technology, even proponents of technologized culture often 
cite some nagging concerns about the pervasiveness of machinery in realms 
once reserved for humans alone. 
     Because of it’s visibility and the anxiety it inspires, coupled with ever-
present and ongoing debates about the ethical dimensions of using more 
advanced technology in various arenas, posthumanism is often wrongly defined 
in terms of technology alone.  However, any view of posthumanism that is limited 
to the melding of human and machine is overly simplistic and fails to address the 
other important aspects of posthumanism.  Further, conceptualizing 
posthumanism as effecting only individuals is a mistake. Posthumanism affects 
cultures of people, specific communities, and institutions, as well as the 
conventions governing action and power within those groups.  In this chapter, I 
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will look to the university to examine the ways in which posthumanism is shaping 
institutional identities in the face of the knowledge economy.   
 The knowledge economy is characterized by a work environment where 
individuals must cross-train across departmental and disciplinary boundaries, 
communicate with individuals with a diversity of identities and areas of expertise, 
and where individuals must be ready to master any number of technological tools 
to succeed.  To meet the needs of future workers in the knowledge economy, our 
universities are adopting various strategies, such as the implementation of 
service learning, to successfully adapt to the demands of posthumanism.   
 The American university in general, and the humanities specifically, is 
struggling to make sense of its place in a culture shaped by fast capitalism, 
oppositional politics, boutique multiculturalism, social hierarchies, free markets, 
technological revolution, international conflict, and a host of other phenomena 
that challenge the university as a site of traditional humanistic inquiry. At the 
same time, these forces highlight the university’s more modern roles in the 
knowledge economy as a credentialing service, gatekeeper, and commercial 
incubator. 
 A commonplace view of popular versions of posthumanism features the 
incorporation of technology into the body. Modern academic institutions have 
embraced their roles as technology showcases, serving as environments in 
which students test the limits of their comfort with new technologies. But we 
rarely talk about the role of educational institutions in introducing students to this 
process of incorporation in anything but positive terms, and thus have neglected 
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the ways in which the college curriculum mediates the anxiety associated with 
losing one’s humanity and putting on a more technologized identity. How do 
college curriculums, for instance, both enable students to see their bodies as 
“incarnations of worldwide webs and global networks,” and reassure them of their 
essential humanity (Taylor, Moment 17)?  
 I want to consider how the tension between humanistic inquiry and 
posthumanistic incorporation to technological and technocratic systems has 
shaped the college curriculum, and I argue in the following chapter that the rise 
of service learning across many disciplines is a marker of the attempts by 
colleges to position themselves within a humanistic tradition of seeking truth and 
serving others, even as they participate in preparing students for posthuman 
networks of distributed production and the modern reality of career-hopping and 
consultation. Consider the description of one writer’s professional life: 
You cannot call such meandering a career; it was more like a wind-up doll 
moving along a crooked path by careening into walls. I have lost count, 
but since 1965, I have had at least two dozen different employers and six 
different episodes of self-employment. I spent twenty of those years as a 
contractor, writing for hire on a project-by-project basis, as opposed to 
being an employee in the business. As a contractor, I seldom saw a 
project through to its conclusion. I was usually involved in another project 
by the time the video was released, the manual was published, or the 
presentation was made. (Kenney 157) 
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Here is a prescient insight into the post-industrial reality of specialized labor 
practices in which employees can be plugged in and out of the production cycle 
as needed, never working on a product from start to finish. It is also a 
representation of the posthuman workplace at the heart of the knowledge 
economy, one with flattened structures where connection and collaboration are 
more important than hierarchy, where job responsibilities are flexible, and where 
employees are more likely to seek another job with higher pay than to get a raise 
where they are. Such positions are now characterized by complex ecologies of 
information that employees must continually filter, analyze, and translate.  
 The role of technology in enabling this filtering, analysis, and translation 
has led to universities touting features such as their high-speed connections to 
the internet backbone, as well as their number of wired classrooms, wi-fi hot 
spots, and open-use computer labs. In most disciplines, the existence of 
advanced technologies can determine the curriculum and the specializations with 
which students can graduate. Even in the field of writing studies, most programs 
that give advanced degrees in technical writing or web design have usability labs 
on campus in which students use an array of recording devices to collect 
feedback from the readers of their documents. Schools laud their integration of 
blogs, podcasts, and wikis into their curriculum, and many have developed online 
courses and developed partnerships to distribute content through iTunes and 
other technology services. In their research programs, schools have worked hard 
to develop centers in emerging and commercially viable areas such as 
biotechnology, genetics, informatics, and military technologies. All of this 
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beckons students with the promise of success in today’s technologically 
advanced posthuman workplace. 
 Although it is easy to focus on the hard sciences as the site of the 
uncritical embrace of technology, the role of technology in the humanities 
demands a similar critique. In fact, William Spanos traces the tendency to ignore 
the role of technology in the humanities back to Foucault’s application of the 
base-superstructure model of classical Marxism, in which Foucault describes an  
“unevenly developed discourse [which has] inadvertently reinscribed the false 
opposition” between the sciences and the humanities (47). Rather, Spanos 
claims that the humanities are just as complicit in the uncritical endorsement and 
obfuscation of the posthuman condition. As he writes: scholars continue to 
“identify the ‘regime of truth” with the scientific/technological/capitalist 
establishment while minimizing the role that literature, philosophy, and the arts, 
and the institutions that transmit their ‘truths,’ play.” This chapter, then, wants to 
consider the ideological implications of perhaps one of the most sacred practices 
of liberal education—service learning—and argue that its embrace is a response 
to posthumanism that does not sufficiently critique its own objectives, and one 
that allows the university to appease both humanistic and posthumanistic 
compulsions. It is, in short, a marker of the university’s fractured and composite 
identity.  
 At a time when several state legislatures and some universities are 
considering the so-called “Academic Freedom Bill of Rights” (which attempts to 
impose ideological balance upon academic classrooms), when conservative 
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organizations are offering bounties for evidence of academic liberal bias, and 
when web sites expose “radical” teachers and call for their dismissal, service 
learning and the circulation of information about it might be seen as a defensive 
strategy. By making the work of professors knowable, visible, and 
comprehensible to the public, service learning eases apprehension about what 
happens within classroom walls. This effort is aided by the human interest aspect 
of service learning which encourages media coverage and is easily appropriated 
for official university promotional efforts. The image of service learning in which 
students contribute to the success of their communities as part of their college 
education thus alleviates the anxiety that they are becoming dehumanized in 
their quest for employment, status, and knowledge. Service learning assures the 
public that students are not adopting the elitism associated with the ivory tower. 
 Service learning also plays well to the anti-intellectualism of modern 
society. News articles perennially denounce the “esoteric shop talk” at academic 
conferences like MLA. Service learning has the virtue, at least, of being easy to 
understand. And the service performed for the community provides a 
counterpoint to the common view of university professors as out-of-touch elites 
protected from political, economic, and cultural forces. For many teachers, the 
introduction of local service projects into curricula enhances students’ 
understanding of citizenship and community as it also enhances the 
understanding of course content. For some like Donald Lazere, however, the 
focus on local politics is disturbing, since he sees it as a political retreat. He 
warns that “the limited aims of purely local activism signal a constriction in 
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political consciousness that has grave consequences for the future of this 
generation” (354). Likewise, service learning may also be a retreat from 
posthumanism. 
 In general, academics are happy and willing to adopt service learning 
pedagogies that place students in real-world situations. As we saw in the 
previous chapter looking at the real-world activities of virtual gaming 
communities, such contexts do promise to allow students a better understanding 
of the situated nature of communication. But the broader reasons for the 
widespread adoption of service learning are not merely pedagogical. They are 
part of the process by which institutions are becoming posthuman.  
 
Working through Posthumanism 
What does it mean to work as a posthuman, and how do schools prepare 
students for this work? Several recent texts have engaged with the idea of 
working in network culture in an attempt to better understand the place of the 
individual within what is now termed the age of “distributed work.”  An entire 
special issue of Technical Communication Quarterly was devoted to such work, 
which editor Clay Spinuzzi defines as “coordinative, polycontextual, cross-
disciplinary work that splices together divergent work activities (separated by 
time, space, organization, and objectives) and that enables the transformations 
of information and texts that characterize such work” (265). Melinda Turnley has 
similarly described the demands of workers in posthuman workplaces as 
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requiring interconnected sets of literacies that are “layered” to “combine basic, 
rhetorical, social, technological, ethical, and critical skills” (104).   
 In the past, employees developed “vertical expertise,” where career 
learning happened strictly within the boundaries of a particular discipline. Over 
the course of a career, an individual would acquire more and more expertise and 
experience in her field only (Engeström, Y., Engeström R., and Vähääho 346). 
Advancement in this professional setting was based on a hierarchy in which the 
knowledge needed as both worker and manager was well-established. 
Posthuman environments characterized by distributed work demand a kind of 
“horizontal expertise” where individuals learn across boundaries, across 
“organizations, activities, disciplines, fields, trades, and settings” (Engeström, Y., 
Engeström, R., and Kärkkäinen 320).  Service learning produces horizontal 
expertise by asking students to cross the boundaries of the classroom and the 
institution in order to work with community organizations and within community 
organizations. In many cases, these organizations demand a range of skills of 
the students, skills that go far beyond those typically assessed in any single 
college course. This is not unlike the scenario addressed in the previous chapter, 
in which video games call upon gamers to engage in a wide variety of literate 
activities. Spinuzzi correctly notes that communicators in today’s technologically 
saturated world must be “one part writer, one part project manager, one part 
programmer, and one part student”  (273). 
My own experience with writing professionally reinforces this sense that to 
be a contributing member of the new workforce and individual must wear many 
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hats. Even when I was hired as a “technical writer,” I didn’t do just technical 
writing.  In total honesty, I don’t think the organizations that hired me could really 
articulate what they needed me to do.  They just knew they wanted something 
done.  Often, it is the work of the technical communicator to figure out what 
needs to be done, how to get it done, and then to communicate some sort of 
understanding to a number of audiences after actually doing whatever it was that 
needed done. Technical writers are expected to be experts in technology, 
whatever that technology may do, and for that reason they must be willing to 
learn on the job and to assume any number of professional identities in order to 
be successful (or perhaps, to simply justify their existence). Technical writers 
must be skilled in communicating to everyone, as they are likely to come into 
contact with others across disciplinary, organizational, and departmental 
boundaries in their distributed work environments.   
Working in a distributed work environment in our posthuman age, 
technical writers aren’t limited to writing software manuals. They are designing 
interfaces, managing workgroups, building databases, testing usability, marketing 
identities, and editing multimedia. It is difficult for any single classroom to 
reproduce the conditions of the posthuman workplace because the concerns of 
most teachers seem, perhaps unfairly, to be relatively narrow. But experiences 
such as service learning, by compelling students to satisfy the varied, and 
sometimes unreasonable, demands of real clients, come close to what 
professional writers experience every day. 
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During their professional lives, students will have to meet the demands of 
clients.  Meeting the demands of clients may be a somewhat different task than 
meeting the demands of the student’s discipline.  In other words, some projects  
may require students accomplish tasks for a client that might not have been a 
focus of their academic studies.  In order to meet the demands of clients, 
students must use skills culled from multiple college courses (and sometimes 
skills learned as needed during the project).  
Because so many companies have flattened their organizational 
structures, the range of skills required to be a contributing member of an 
organization has broadened. While students will be required to master skills 
outside of their disciplines, ironically, this post-disciplinary approach may serve to 
make each discipline’s content more meaningful to students. As an article in a 
recent Proceedings from the American Society for Engineering Education noted, 
one reason engineering students fail to realize the importance of writing is that 
communication is “often treated as a set of skills that students are supposed to 
acquire outside of engineering” (2261).  The authors argue that students need to 
see the relation between their work in communications and their core coursework 
and skill set, including problem solving, equations, modeling processes, and 
product design. Composition theorists and writing teachers have known this for a 
long time now—that effective writing instruction is grounded in authentic work 
that calls on complex set of literacies. The practice of learning though 
communication—especially communication within actual organizations—will 
better enable our students to acquire both the vertical and horizontal expertise 
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they will need to succeed in posthuman workplaces that demand distributed work 
skills.    
In some ways, the posthuman shift toward distributed work is facilitated by 
our changing physical environments.  In the late 60s, Robert Probst introduced 
American offices to moveable, low-walled cubicles. The mobility of cubicles 
reflected a new modular attitude towards work—cubicles, employees, and 
information could all be added, moved, or removed very easily. Now, perhaps, 
we are shifting towards office environments like the ones we see in commercials 
for business credit cards, where employees crash on bean bag chairs behind 
laptops, seated in a circle to share ideas.  In other representations, giant dark 
rooms fill with prone employees lying silent and “ideating.”  The heavy oak 
seminar desk has been replaced by a ping pong table.  While this certainly isn’t 
everywhere, it is definitely a trend, as evidenced by the offices of some very 
visible and highly successful companies such as Google, RedBull, and Pixar.  
These changing physical spaces facilitate working in new ways—sharing 
ideas without heed to boundaries, working in group settings, working beyond job 
titles, and of course, working in both virtual and material environments.  In these 
complex ecologies, each employee holds multiple roles, and is no longer 
expected to perform only the responsibilities of his or her job title. In the age of 
posthumanism, workers must perform what Spinuzzi calls “interpenetrated 
work”—work that “involve(s) more communication, more and different types of 
communication, and consequently more need for rhetorical analysis and 
rhetorical skill” (266). The classroom is a poor proxy for the complex and 
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unpredictable working conditions students may find themselves in after 
graduation.  
As a way for students to gain the type of identities and habits associated 
with posthuman workplaces, service learning has served admirably, all the while 
presenting itself as a humanistic endeavor focused on serving the needs of the 
community. In other words, service learning is just one more machine into which 
posthuman selves can plug themselves. It is a technology of self that produces 
posthuman subjectivities primed for employment in posthuman systems. These 
posthuman workplaces have been primarily formed, not by humanistic concerns, 
but by economic and political forces. So, in the rest of this chapter, I want to pay 
particular attention to how the same economic and political forces that have 
shaped posthuman workplaces are affecting institutions of higher education as 
well, and are driving the current popularity of service-learning pedagogies among 
stakeholders committed to both humanistic and posthumanistic ideals. 
 
The Service Machine 
“It is not learning but the spirit of service that will give a college a place in the 
annals of the nation.” 
—Woodrow Wilson, Princeton in the Nation’s Service 
 
“In order to maintain the use of this teaching tool and to keep it fresh and 
productive, it is crucial for us to consider the dark side of the pedagogy and be 
alert to situations that might create a negative experience for any involved.” 
—Toni S. Whitfield, “The Dark Side of Service Learning”  
 
When the term service learning first appeared in print in the U.S. in 1967 
in the Southern Regional Education Board’s work to provide state leaders with 
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resources for long-range education planning, many campuses already held a 
strong commitment to the public good as part of their academic mission (Jacoby 
12). Indeed, the academic commitment to public service has long received strong 
support from students, administrators, and public policy. Scholars such as John 
Dewey had laid the humanistic foundation for interest in service learning through 
their support of experiential education in the first half of the twentieth century, as 
did national policies such as the Morrill Act of 1862 which established U.S. land-
grant institutions for the study of agricultural and mechanical arts. But it was not 
until the 1960s, marked by the creation of the Peace Corps in 1961 and the 
Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) program in 1965, that significant 
interest developed in the U.S. in the educational value of service.  
Today, service learning is used to refer to various forms of “experiential 
education in which students engage in activities that address human and 
community needs together with structured activities intentionally designed to 
promote learning and development” (Jacoby 5). In the idealized grassroots 
version of service learning, students in a chemistry class might test local water 
bodies for certain chemicals and report their findings to government agencies 
and advocacy groups, while students in a technical writing class might design a 
web site for a non-profit organization. The less idealistic version of service 
learning has much more in common with traditional entrepreneurial partnerships 
between business and education. In all cases, the stated goal is to enhance 
student learning while providing a service to the community. Despite the “periodic 
mortality” of interest in it over the last forty years, service learning has achieved 
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an increasingly stable position in higher education, especially since the mid 
1980s (Zlotkowski 22). Membership in Campus Compact (2007)—a national 
coalition of U.S. college and university presidents “committed to fulfilling the 
public purposes of higher education” through initiatives such as service 
learning—has grown from only 4 members in 1985 to now nearly 1,100 (“About”). 
Once thought to be mainly the project of progressive educators influenced 
by the civil rights and other social justice movements, service learning has 
become institutionalized and professionalized internationally through a host of 
specialized journals, conferences, associations, grant programs, textbooks, 
seminars, book series, campus offices, and dedicated university personnel.14 
“Unencumbered by a disciplinary identity,” service learning has flourished in 
fields ranging from physical education to architecture, and can be found in some 
form in every academic discipline (Schutz and Gere 179). The “decentralized 
interest in service linked to higher education” appears in many places, such as in 
the statements of commitment to community service now commonly found in 
official university documents (Zlotkowski 22). Due to this broad distribution, a 
wide range of activities constitute service learning practice, from community 
advocacy projects to discipline-specific tutoring to internships with local 
businesses. Depending on which scholar you read, there are anywhere from two 
to a dozen different models of service learning. Such flexibility is one of service 
learning’s strengths, and a vital aspect of its curricular durability. As Donald 
Lazere has written, “No one size fits all in experiential learning; each situation 
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calls for its own model based on its own teaching site, pool of students, and 
community” (355).  
Service learning has contributed to the commodification of knowledge in 
our posthuman university system that increasingly emphasizes utility over the 
traditional values of a liberal education. Additionally, the performance of service 
is related to the creation and distribution of knowledge about the academy and its 
inhabitants. Here, I won’t focus, as others have done, on the failure of service-
learning practitioners to help students discover “systemic explanation[s]” for 
social ills and their tendency to see “social problems as chiefly or only personal” 
(Herzberg, “Community” 309). While valid, such critiques ironically view this 
problem as a personal failure of the teacher to take advantage of the critical 
potential inherent in service-learning pedagogies. Rather, I want to question the 
degree to which the larger discourse of service in the corporatized university 
opposes the traditional goals of service learning (and thus the traditional 
humanist foundation of service learning).  
David Coogan has argued for greater attention to the material conditions 
in which service learning occurs, and has written that “effective advocacy does 
not begin with the principles of good argument, . . . but with an analysis of those 
historical and material conditions that have made some arguments more viable 
than others” (668). In a similar fashion, I intend to interrogate the material 
conditions that have, for many teachers, made service learning approaches more 
viable than other pedagogies in today’s academic climate, as well as in the global 
climate where attitudes toward American institutions are at risk of being 
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negatively impacted by international events. Such an approach draws attention to 
how the institutional embrace of service learning in a knowledge economy is 
based, not just on civic, cognitive, and moral justifications, but on economic and 
political factors as well. The pressure placed on educators by the connectivity of 
the classroom to both the local and global community to adopt pedagogies that 
make use of these connections via service partnerships is one aspect of the 
posthuman era. No longer can responsible educators manage classrooms and 
students as if they are not already connected to the world beyond the classroom 
walls. Service learning makes these connections explicit, although it may also 
limit these connections in troubling ways.  
Although in general I support (and have practiced) service-learning 
pedagogies, and recognize the many potential personal and social benefits to 
such activity, I also want to be critical of the ways in which the discourse 
surrounding service learning can be co-opted by those seeking to solidify the 
influence of market logic and corporate culture over educational institutions. 
Critical assessment of how projects are chosen, implemented, and evaluated 
must be a part of every service-learning program. Otherwise, as Robert Crooks 
has written, service learning can become a “kind of voluntary band-aiding of 
social problems that not only ignores the causes of problems but lets off the hook 
those responsible for the problem” (Qtd. in Lazere 309). Hesitant to address root 
social causes, service-learning practitioners may neglect opportunities for 
“uniting knowledge-making and political action” in favor of less risky forms of 
community engagement (Cushman, “Public” 328). In these ways, service 
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learning unintentionally serves to legitimize the authority of market-savvy 
institutions by providing them a way to signify their commitment to the public 
good, while allowing them to avoid producing significant changes in the 
communities they serve. Such a possibility is a disservice to the public good to 
which service learning seeks to contribute.  
 
Free Labor and the Production of Marketable Universities  
“It is the vanity of educators that they shape the educational system to their 
preferred image. They may not be without influence but the decisive force is the 
economic system.”  
–John Kenneth Galbraith (1967), The New Industrial State 
 
 When the passage above was published in 1967, in a book the author 
himself considered his “principal effort in economic argument,” Galbraith was an 
economist and public figure whose analyses following his defection from 
neoclassical economic theories generated wide interest from those seeking to 
balance the public good with private interests (xiii). Especially for 
“institutionalists”—those economists who look to human-designed institutions as 
primary shapers of economic and human activity—Galbraith’s writings provided a 
welcome contrast to neoclassical theories that assumed that individuals act 
rationally to maximize utility and companies naturally attempt to maximize profit. 
Institutional economics promised instead to “discern in the variety of institutional 
situations impinging upon individuals the chief source of differences in the 
content of their behavior” (Hamilton 314, 318).15  
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By decentering the control over the shape of educational institutions from 
individual educators to economic forces, Galbraith contributed to a posthuman 
understanding of the place of individuals within larger systems. But Galbraith was 
unwilling to deny agency to individuals totally. His approach recognized that 
“institutions are social arrangements capable of change rather than obstinate 
natural phenomena” and, therefore, held out the possibility of agency even as it 
emphasized the primary structural role of social institutions (Hamilton 318). In 
many ways, this is a prescient view of the dialectical relationship between 
humanism and posthumanism.  
I believe this short review of institutional economic theory provides a  
useful balance to the following discussion on the sway of market forces over 
contemporary institutions of higher learning (and, in fact, helps to explain their 
ascendancy). Some writers are indeed fond of reporting the commodification of 
higher education as an unassailable “natural phenomena,” predicting that despite 
faculty resistance, “market forces will have a stronger say” (Oblinger and Verville 
156). But the nature of institutions of higher education, and of organizations in 
general, as “social arrangements capable of change” provides hope that the 
commercial relations that characterize the modern university can be refashioned 
without abandoning the university’s need for economic survival, and without 
abandoning ideals of intellectual and civic engagement. And I believe service 
learning can be an important component of this renewal, but only if educators 
understand the ways in which service activities within the university have already 
been subsumed by the logic of the market. 
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That the modern university’s participation in the knowledge economy is 
economically driven is a given. As the editors of Capitalizing Knowledge have 
stated plainly, the “transformation of the universities from institutions of cultural 
preservation to institutions for the creation of new knowledge” is “due to external 
pressures arising from constriction in government funding for academic research 
accompanied by the growing awareness of the practical uses of academic 
knowledge” (Etzkowitz et al. 1–2). 16 Critiques of the state of higher education in 
the knowledge economy have not directly addressed the role of service learning, 
however. Stanley Aronowitz’s The Knowledge Factory, for instance, made no 
mention of the service-learning movement, although it does discuss at length 
higher education’s reduction to the “training [of] young people for specialized 
occupations for the corporate job markets” under the auspice of 
“vocationalization” (17).  
Although service learning helps fulfill the mission of the corporatized 
university, it is uncommon for even fully praiseworthy assessments of the 
corporatized university to mention service learning. In 2002, for instance, the 
U.S. Southern Growth Policies Board published Innovation U.: New University 
Roles in a Knowledge Economy, a collection of case studies documenting the 
economic impact of U.S. universities that engaged in university-industry 
partnerships. The authors of this text limited participation in the knowledge 
economy to activities that contribute to “industrial innovation and performance” 
through applied research, that provide vocational training to “human capital,” that 
enable “technology transfer,” and that foster entrepreneurism (Tornatzky et al. 
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16). But service learning made no appearance in any of their case studies (which 
is possibly simply a discursive effect related to the conventional opposition of the 
sciences and the humanities identified by Spanos). But it’s not as if service 
learning could not have been incorporated into their model of the knowledge 
economy. Service-learning projects could easily qualify as what they called 
“extension activities”—activities in which academic expertise allows businesses 
to make “optimal or novel use of existing knowledge” (Tornatzky et al. 17).  
The lack of reference to “service learning” in Innovation U. is surprising 
given that Stanford University is one of the twelve schools profiled in Innovation 
U. Since the 1980s, Stanford has made service learning an integral part of its 
educational and administrative structure, and is home to the highly visible Haas 
Center for Public Service. The association of Stanford with excellence in service 
learning is such that it is not uncommon to hear educators refer to the model of 
service learning in which students write as their service to the community (by 
producing documents for local organizations; as opposed to writing about their 
service) as the “Stanford model for service-learning” (Bowdon and Scott 8). In the 
same year Innovation U. was published, Stanford was even recognized by US 
News and World Report as the number one university in the country for service 
learning (Cho). Such oversights are admittedly common and ideologically 
motivated. They are, however, poor indicators of the impact that service learning 
has in the posthuman knowledge economy.  
Aronowitz has argued that faculty in the new corporatized university do not 
work primarily to advance their disciplines or to educate students, but to produce 
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“useful knowledge, which can be measured by the amount of grant money, 
commercial applications, or critical recognition they receive in appropriate circles 
and which may enhance the institution’s prestige” (159). Faculty are, in short, 
measured as machines in terms of their productivity. Aronowitz persuasively 
traces how universities have succumbed to demands for the “vocationalization of 
education” by “introducing vocational courses into the curriculum, and 
encouraging internships—often coded as ‘experiential learning’—aimed at 
inducing employers to hire their graduates” (127, 160).  
It is possible that vocationalism—now commonly coded as “service 
learning”—continues to justify the academy’s deference to market forces while 
also contributing to the university’s ability to place graduates in jobs. It is one way 
of claiming the humanistic high ground provided in the term “service,” while 
yielding to the posthuman confluence between commercial and educational 
interests. Having adopted the commercial model of an economy in which 
knowledge “enables us to achieve measurable outcomes, such as a financial 
profit . . . or a credential that has strong importance in the marketplace . .  . the 
academy has difficulty affirming the autonomy of knowledge apart from its market 
value” (Gould 24). 
This narrowed focus has led to the reduction in funding of, or the outright 
cutting of, less marketable programs, often under the rubric of developing 
“excellence” in limited areas. This “explicitly business discourse of excellence” 
actually works to “shape institutions of higher education so that they will more 
efficiently serve as conduits for meeting the needs of local, national, and 
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transnational corporate interests” (Downing et al. 9). The shift toward developing 
excellence, Bill Readings writes in The University in Ruins, is an empty marketing 
strategy that attempts to “overcome the problem of the question of value across 
disciplines, since excellence is [supposedly] the common denominator of good 
research in all fields” (24). The lack of any fixed standard of judgment does not 
deter the marketing of higher education, however. As Wesley Shumar wrote in 
College for Sale: A Critique of the Commodification of Higher Education: 
If [education] could be sold, a demand could be created for it. Consumers 
could be found, or invented. This increased the image-producing—public 
relations, advertising, market research, etc.—functions of the university 
dramatically. College degrees, subject to market forces, started to be 
managed in new ways. (83) 
How universities market themselves, and the constituencies they court, 
thus become significant forces in university curriculum and policy decisions. 
Shumar noted that many of the traditional comprehensive liberal arts colleges 
that survived the transition to the “instrumental logic of the marketplace” were 
able to do so because they “developed a hotel management school, a physical 
therapy program or some other form of practical education” that could be 
marketed to the community (94). It is unsurprising that many modern universities 
“produce new specialized degrees and certificates in order to make buyers desire 
the product” (Shumar 83).  
Such discourse openly acknowledges that education is a “product or 
service; something to be sold to the public.” The alternative to embracing the new 
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“entrepreneurial university” is to raise tuition, a choice few schools can afford to 
make in the increasingly competitive environment of higher education. The 
emergence of education as commodity also means a sharp increase in the role 
of marketing in higher education. Just as market segmentation in consumer 
goods led companies to produce “specialized products for smaller target 
audiences in the hope of selling more goods,” higher education has had to 
appeal to specific groups of students through targeted campaigns (Shumar 86).  
 In such a marketplace, schools must become savvy producers of 
knowledge about themselves. As Powell and Snellman have pointed out, 
“thousands of polytechnic schools worldwide . . . have changed their names to 
universities. Such ‘upgrading’ is part of a movement to signal membership in a 
knowledge economy” (216). It is possible that the adoption of service learning 
pedagogies, especially for elite schools seeking the patronage of practically-
minded consumers but wary of associating themselves too strongly with 
vocationalism, is yet another attempt to develop marketable excellence.  
 
Service Learning in the Knowledge Economy 
“I don't believe that questions about social structures, ideology, 
 and social justice are automatically raised by community service. 
From my own experience, I am quite sure they are not.” 
—Bruce Herzberg, “Community Service and Critical Teaching” 
 
Although the purposes for implementing service learning are necessarily 
diverse, in the most general sense, service-learning programs offer a way to 
satisfy concurrently the public’s desire for the practical application of academic 
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knowledge, the student’s desire for professional experience, the university’s 
desire for community outreach, and the faculty’s desire for social justice and 
professional distinction. In a less admirable manner, it can also provide students 
with a type of flattering self-knowledge, exploiting service to the other as a source 
of “life-changing” moments and “spiritual renewal” (Albert 186; hooks 183). Such 
moments of personal renewal might be seen as an individualized response to the 
crisis in humanism. In other words, to combat the sense of decenteredness 
attendant to posthumanism, students are being offered the chance to connect at 
a personal level with other human beings, addressing systemic problems at the 
level of the individual.  
Academics as well may be guilty of embracing service learning as a 
flexible commodity in the knowledge economy—an efficient means to satisfy all 
three traditional areas of academic evaluation (teaching, research, and service). 
Multi-tasking academics can deploy service-learning pedagogies in the 
classroom, present scholarship on service-learning topics in specialized journals 
and at conferences, and make good on their personal and professional 
commitments to community engagement, all the while outsourcing the majority of 
the service to their students and enjoying the “countercultural” reputation still 
associated with experiential education (Morton 279). 
Ideally, service learning allows “various knowledges [to] be brought to 
bear in problem-solving activities without the privileging of academic knowledge 
above the others” (Cushman, “New” 211). But the privileging of academic 
knowledge seems a mild threat in today’s corporatized university. More likely, the 
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knowledges engaged will be limited to those that “make money, study money, or 
attract money” (Press and Washburn 52). Part of the ease with which service 
learning can be co-opted by market values lies in the similarity between the 
discourse of advocates of service learning and those of the corporatized 
university. In What Business Wants from Higher Education, Diana Oblinger and 
Anne-Lee Verville reported that business leaders want flexible workers with 
stronger communication skills, the ability to work in teams, an understanding of 
globalization and its implications, the ability to work with people of diverse 
backgrounds, and adequate ethics training (22).  
These correlate well with the stated objectives of many service–learning 
advocates (especially the latter two qualities above—multiculturalism and moral 
education), and with the common practices of service-learning classrooms, which 
are almost uniformly collaborative. Oblinger and Verville also stress the need of 
businesses for a pool of potential employees with “practical experience” (90). In 
fact, the authors explicitly called for pedagogies that provide “real-world 
exposure” through “internship[s] or cooperative experience[s]” that connect 
students to the culture of their future employers (92). Such appeals sound similar 
to those made by academics who promote service learning by claiming that 
“practical experience enhances learning” (Zlotkowski 24). Even the insistence 
among scholars for service learning to “address social issues important to 
community members” is not that far removed from the corporate “obsession” in 
“delivering what is of value to the client, not necessarily what is of value to the 
producer” (Cushman, “Public” 329; Oblinger and Verville 77). 
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In order to survive in the competitive market for products and services, 
modern corporations have adopted several strategies that reduce costs and 
maintain a flexible workforce, including downsizing, outsourcing, economies of 
scale, and strategic alliances with other businesses. But the strategy most 
important to understanding the role of service in the posthuman knowledge 
economy is the acquisition of beneficial externalities. Externalities are, put 
simply, the “effect of a business transaction that benefits or hurts persons other 
than those who directly take part in the transaction” (Baumol and Blinder 269). 
Beneficial externalities are, in the crassest sense, external conditions that 
improve a company’s profit margin in a business transaction. Subsidies and other 
economic incentives that reduce the cost of doing business would qualify, as 
would less legitimate ways of avoiding the true cost of delivering a product or 
service (such as avoiding the cost of disposing of hazardous waste by dumping it 
illegally). By getting external entities to absorb the material costs of bringing a 
product to market, corporations can maintain market share and remain 
competitive without changing other aspects of their business model.  
The ability of corporations to outsource their research and training needs 
to university faculty is a beneficial externality that increases the profit available 
through transactions with actual customers. More importantly, profit can be 
generated in a knowledge economy through the commercialization of intellectual 
property rights made available to corporations through industry-university 
research partnerships (Tornatzky et al. 17). And it is not only corporations who 
recognize the value of externalities. This fact was brought to my attention quite 
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vividly when, after contacting a local non-profit in hopes of arranging a service-
learning project, I discovered that my email had been forwarded with this altered 
subject line: “Opportunity for FREE LABOR!”. In everyday language, a beneficial 
externality is “simply a good deed for which the doer of the deed is not paid, or 
not paid adequately, for the benefit he or she produces” (Baumol and Blinder 
270). In other words, it is service.  
One might point out that students engaged in service learning do benefit 
from their association with the organizations they work with, primarily in the form 
of knowledge and experience gained. But such knowledge exchanges are just 
another example of how corporate models of reciprocity mirror the ideals of 
academia and community found in service-learning pedagogies. Lost in such 
exchanges is what Michael Bérubé has called the “very ideal of independent 
intellectual inquiry, the kind of inquiry whose outcomes cannot be known in 
advance and cannot be measured in terms of efficiency or productivity” (21). It is 
questionable whether service-learning pedagogies that emphasize the pragmatic 
benefits accruing to organizations and individuals in knowledge exchanges can 
truly prepare students to achieve what the Association of American Colleges and 
Universities has identified as the goal of a liberal education: “to live responsible, 
productive, and creative lives in a dramatically changing world” (“About AACU”).  
It is, of course, possible that service-learning opportunities can be 
structured that do not merely cede educational goals to professional goals. The 
inclusion of critical reflection as a necessary part of any service-learning 
experience, for instance, can draw attention to larger social issues by de-
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naturalizing the inequalities and ideologies that students encounter. Without such 
reflection, Bruce Herzberg has written, “students will not critically question a 
world that seems natural, inevitable, given; instead, they will strategize about 
their position within it” (“Community” 317). But the posthuman emphasis on one’s 
position in a network of humanity may move students to continually assess their 
education, not in terms of an abstract rubric of intellectual value, but in terms of 
the positions and connections made available to them through their schoolwork.  
Besides producing knowledge desired by the community, service learning 
also produces knowledge about the university (about it being a good community 
member, for instance) that can be used to gain advantage in a competitive 
marketplace. Outreach efforts are not unique to universities, of course. Through 
its Space Alliance Technology Outreach Program (SATOP), NASA provides to 
small businesses engineers who will attempt to apply their engineering expertise 
to solve problems impeding the business’ financial success. Though provided 
free of charge, these efforts are not merely philanthropic. As one reporter 
commented: “For all its altruism, the 12-year-old SATOP also serves as a public 
relations campaign, demonstrating to the public that NASA has worthy effects 
outside the confines of space exploration” (Rexrode).  
The present traction of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
movement, where corporations are expected to give back to their communities, 
and the increasing popularity of fair-trade and socially responsible goods, 
suggest that commitment to the public good, and the humanism that serves as 
the foundation of this public good, is itself a marketable commodity in the 
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knowledge economy. Some analysts even consider CSR a form of “global brand 
insurance” which provides a “competitive strategy because [brands] serve as 
profit platforms that differentiate even commodity-like products and services” 
(Werther and Chandler 317). As institutions of higher learning continue to reach 
out to global markets, such protection of the “intangible and vulnerable” capital 
embodied in their university brands will become increasingly valuable (Werther 
and Chandler 321). Not only do service learners participate in the knowledge 
economy by providing expertise to the local community and by producing new 
knowledge for private, governmental, and corporate entities, service learning also 
extends university brands within the global education marketplace. 
 
Ranking Service: Serving Rankings 
“No one can mistake what the modern university stands for: service to society.” 
—Eric Gould, The University in a Corporate Culture 
 
College rankings such as those produced by US News and World Report 
and The Washington Monthly are highly contested markers of higher education’s 
entrenchment within the knowledge economy. These rankings have received 
heavy criticism, both from academic and popular sources critical of the formulas 
used to determine placement, as well as from university administrators who, 
aware that the “flow of tuition dollars is affected by popular rankings,” feel 
pressured to “behave in ways that, collectively, may damage” all institutions of 
higher education (Goldin B24; Qtd. in Engell and Dangerfield 35). Although 
originating in meritocratic intentions to “mitigate or even to negate the power of 
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wealth and privilege,” rankings have become a “controversial but nonetheless 
authoritative” system that threatens to draw resources away from the core 
missions of educational institutions (Engell and Dangerfield 34; Goldin B24).  
Even though rankings are considered only one of the indicators of school 
quality, their impact is powerful because they are, unfortunately, “becoming the 
only indicators in popular circulation” (Engell and Dangerfield 35). So, while 
corporations and other community organizations have become dependent upon 
universities for knowledge services necessary to stay competitive in the global 
market, universities concerned with maintaining their “brand” have become 
beholden to the knowledge circulated about them by the ranking industry and to 
the market logics that guide such systems.  
What types of engagement, one might ask, do such classifications 
recognize and encourage? In an article for the Chronicle of Higher Education, 
Rebecca Goldin critiqued rankings by the Washington Monthly. She noted that 
one-third of the Washington Monthly score is based on “community service,” and 
that this third is composed of three measures: “the percentage of students in 
Army or Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC); the percentage of alumni 
currently serving in the Peace Corps; and the percentage of those students on 
Federal Work-Study doing community projects” (Goldin B24). Observing that 
schools will attempt to increase their rankings because the “flow of tuition dollars 
is affected by popular rankings,” she asked a logical question: “To raise their 
rankings, will universities encourage ROTC participation?” The models of service 
and the ideal of the public good that rankings promote are thus severely limited.  
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Ultimately, it is within the classification systems themselves that 
educational value is created. Oblinger and Verville have explained the nature of 
quality in the modern market thusly: 
First, quality is perceived. It is based on the customer’s judgment, not 
one’s own. Second, the quality of the product is important, but most 
competitive situations will be won or lost on the quality of the services that 
are associated with the product rather than the product itself. Third, quality 
is relative, not absolute. (13) 
Thus, rankings and classifications that compare institutions establish a hierarchy 
devoid of any substantive measure of quality. This is a particularly posthuman 
problem of circularity in which the circuit of measurement has no external 
referent. Haraway notes that posthumanism is about simulation rather than 
representation. Representation always points to some prior object, and its 
measure is traditionally the faithfulness of the representation to the original. But 
in simulation it is more important to be internally consistent. The establishment of 
educational value in posthuman culture thus makes use of rankings to initiate a 
feedback loop that restricts the ability of institutions to establish value outside of 
the network created by rankings.  
Although service learning has been a part of rankings before, it might be 
considered troubling, based on the overall impact of rankings, that a separate 
community engagement classification now exists. In 2006, 76 U.S. colleges and 
universities were selected by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching for its new community engagement classification. This is an “elective” 
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classification not based on national data, like other rankings, but on 
documentation submitted by each school that describes its engagement, broadly 
conceived, with the community. The Carnegie Foundation described its effort 
spiritedly as “an exciting move in Carnegie's work to extend and refine the 
classification of colleges and universities . . . It represents a significant affirmation 
of the importance of community engagement in the agenda of higher education” 
(“Carnegie”). I submit, however, that such an affirmation is another capitulation to 
market forces and represents universities’ need to differentiate themselves in a 
higher education market in which the content and quality of the curriculum takes 
a backseat to relative comparisons associated with economic measures. By 
reducing the diversity of school curricula and disciplinary strengths to “strictly 
numerical evaluations,” these judgments about academic quality trivialize the 
work of educators, and, quite often, represent little more than the size of a 
university’s endowment (Etzkowitz et al. 34). 
Service can be considered a marketing effort that proves the utility of a 
college degree by supplying the community with practical benefits provided by 
degree-earners. Administrators are increasingly pressured to sell both their own 
school and the very idea of higher education. As Eric Gould observes: “The 
[modern] mission statement is like an advertisement” (5). But such 
advertisements do not necessarily represent the priorities of administrators or 
faculty. Although service is quite visibly included in higher education mission 
statements, the “importance of service is seldom as evident in their work as are 
teaching and research” (Bringle and Hatcher 273). As the University of South 
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Florida has admitted, their community engagement activities are “integral to 
providing students with work experience and establishing a positive presence in 
the community, which in turn can attract future students” (Booth).  
On their own, commitments to service in the agendas of institutions of 
higher education, as visible in their mission statements, have little power to 
attract or repel students. As Gould has argued, “[s]tudents do not choose 
colleges by comparing mission statements because there is little to differentiate 
between the various philosophies they contain” (4). But if mission statements, 
and the commitments to service that they contain, are themselves poor means of 
differentiation in the academic market, the commercial value of service must be 
constructed elsewhere. As suggested above, the ability of local community 
service to attract future students establishes its commercial value. But this only 
works for local consumers. In order for service to influence the global clientele of 
posthuman universities, one needs initiatives like the Carnegie Foundation’s 
Community Engagement Classification. 
Unfortunately, such rankings do not ask hard questions about the nature 
of the community engagement in which the university participates, or about the 
effects of economic partnerships on the educational experiences of students. 
They are committed to measuring the “quality of the services that are associated 
with the product rather than the product itself” (Oblinger and Verville 13). This 
can be seen in the broad definition of what counts as community engagement in 
such classifications. The press release from USF that announced their newly 
bestowed Carnegie classification gave as an example of its community 
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engagement the “launch of a multimillion partnership with Silicon Valley research 
and technology giant SRI International, and [receipt of] $8 million to build a 
Florida Center of Excellence in biotechnology” (Booth). Here, a traditional 
industry-university partnership of the entrepreneurial variety focused on 
developing excellence in a business-friendly discipline is recast as a form of 
community service.  
As Raymond Williams wrote, community is a “warmly persuasive word” 
that “never seems to be used unfavourably, and never to be given any positive 
opposing or distinguishing term” (76, 66). It appears that service may have 
attained this status as well. Visitors to the University of South Florida Tampa 
campus in spring, 2007, encountered two signs posted repeatedly across 
campus. The first sign stated “USF Breaks All Records: $310,000,000 Research 
Awards”; the other stated “Carnegie Foundation Selects USF for Community 
Engagement Classification.” Considering the broad definition of what is counted 
as community engagement, it’s not clear that these signs say anything 
substantially different.  
 
Re-establishing the Posthuman Value of Service 
“It is time all reading and writing teachers situate their activities within the 
contexts of the larger profession as well as the contexts of economic and political 
concerns. We have much to gain working together and much to lose working 
alone.” 
–James Berlin, Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures 
 
For English teachers, the term service is especially provocative.  Gary 
Olson notes in the preface to his edited collection, Rhetoric and Composition as 
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Intellectual Work, that the teaching of writing has historically been considered a 
“service discipline” with no research agenda or tradition of intellectual inquiry of 
its own (xii). Because the historic division of U.S. English departments into 
tenured literature professors and untenured (nowadays, mostly adjunct) writing 
teachers was a partial consequence of the financial difficulty of staffing small 
classes of student writers with well-paid professors, resistance to being a service 
discipline is, in a larger sense, resistance to being compelled by economic 
forces. It is a retreat to the humanism of individual choice and self-determination. 
But Berlin’s statement above regarding reading and writing teachers is true for all 
educators attempting to work in the presence of market forces that sanction 
higher education’s role as a credentialing and research service under the 
auspices of community engagement. By viewing higher education within its 
political and economic contexts, we can begin to understand the ways in which 
posthuman educators “are always already implicated in service relationships with 
extra-disciplinary constituencies” (Mahala and Swilky 627).  
In response to Williams’ statement mentioned earlier that community is 
never given a “positive opposing or distinguishing term,” Joseph Harris has 
suggested that there is such a word: public. Whereas community is most often 
used to identify a group of people (a marketing segment, if you will), Harris has 
argued that public refers to a “kind of space and process, a point of contact that 
needs both to be created and continuously maintained” (109). Such a distinction 
draws attention to both the necessarily political nature of community 
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engagement, and the need to continuously reform the institutions that govern our 
social interactions to better support our visions of responsible citizenship.  
One small step in bringing our institutions into closer accord with the 
ideals of the public good is to make such work visible within the university 
system. In its application for the Carnegie Foundation’s Community Engagement 
Classification, USF admitted that its policies for promotion and tenure do not 
explicitly acknowledge university-community engagement activities, research, 
and scholarship (“Application” 19). Without such internal support, the service-
learning movement risks becoming beholden to those types of service valued by 
market forces and corporate sponsors, and risks losing “many of its best 
practitioners through the failure of the academy as a whole to recognize and 
reward their work” (Zlotkowski 24). 
 The broad interest in service learning is, and always will be, part of the 
economic structure of higher education. In his foreword to Moving Beyond 
Academic Discourse—Christian Weisser’s book on composition studies and the 
public sphere—Gary Olson reports that a chief acquisitions editor of a major 
textbook publisher visited him, as well as several other senior faculty in the field 
of rhetoric and composition, to determine “where the field was heading,” in hopes 
of anticipating the next big thing (“Foreword” ix). In response, Olson mentioned a 
few promising areas to the editor, but  
. . . saved until last the area that that I thought would most likely lead us all 
into the new decade: public writing, especially as it is linked to service 
learning. [The editor’s] eyes immediately lit up (I could almost see the 
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dollar signs shining in his pupils), and he commented excitedly, “This is 
incredible. Practically everyone that I’ve consulted has said the exact 
same thing.” (“Foreword” ix) 
The challenge for service-learning advocates in today’s institutions of higher 
learning is to establish the value of service learning without reverting to economic 
calculation of its value merely as a boon to a student’s ability to obtain 
employment, as a beneficial externality to local organizations, or as a promising 
market niche for textbook publishers. The challenge is also to not retreat from the 
networked social ecologies of modern universities into an introverted humanistic 
rationale for service.  
As Peter Mortensen has written, educators “must go public” because of 
the ethical obligations we hold to the “publics we serve” (150). In his article 
“Service Learning and Public Discourse,” Bruce Herzberg says we can satisfy 
these ethical obligations by using service learning to bridge the “gap between 
academic investigation, on the one hand, and public discourse and public policy, 
on the other” (395). At the 1996 convention of CCCC (Conference on College 
Composition and Communication) Lester Faigley, in his Chair’s address, called 
for academics in English programs to “engage in public discourse” in order to “to 
stop the decline in publicly supported education,” and such calls have been oft 
repeated (41).  
Heeding this call, Herzberg asks his students to draw on conversations in 
the academic, popular, and public spheres in order to “examine and practice 
public discourse forms but also to figure out how to bring their academic 
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knowledge to bear in public argument” (“Public” 399). Rather than assume that 
academic knowledge can easily transfer to public policy issues, Herzberg’s 
students question the very possibility of engaging in public policy issues from the 
academy, recognizing that, more often than not, “public policy follows popular, 
not academic, opinion” (“Public” 395).  
Those of us interested in service learning are well-positioned to engage 
the public, not only as supplicants seeking support for our own agendas, but as 
collaborators who can engage the public in the maintenance of a democratic 
polis. One of the risks of academics engaging the public is exactly that one’s 
message becomes subject to discourses beyond the scope of one’s disciplinary 
interests. In the case of service learning, the dominant discourse which 
educators must address is one which limits the value of knowledge to its 
application towards practical and commercial ends, which embraces 
questionable rankings systems, and which valorizes service as a way of 
generating market-oriented knowledge about universities, teachers, and 
students. When we engage the public, however, we may find that market forces, 
measured against the vitality of posthuman university-community partnerships 
dedicated to the public good, are not the unassailable formations they presume 
to be.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Posthuman (In)Conclusions 
“The only responsible intellectual is one who is wired.”  
--Mark C. Taylor and Esa Saarinen, Imagologies 
 
Current scholarship provides us with an understanding of posthumanism 
that is at once both functional for understanding our relationship to the 
increasingly technologically mediated world around us, and theoretical in 
understanding the human psyche’s attachment to the excesses of humanism. It 
is born of the personal, professional, and cultural networks taking shape in the 
posthuman age. In the most superficial sense, posthumanism will always be 
seen as the blending of human and machine, where individuals incorporate into 
their selves the technological tools previously considered separate from the 
physical body. But it is much more than this. It is the slow and continual 
recognition of a new kind of identity, a new type of community, and a new type of 
relationship with the material world and others in it. Posthumanist views of the 
relationship between subjects is not an either/or choice (human or machine, man 
or woman, image or text, play or work), but a both/and proposition which 
generates hybrids (or, in the traditional humanist view, monstrosities). 
In order to analyze the possibility of educational practices more 
responsive to posthumanism, this dissertation has interrogated the continuing 
importance of the body as the site of emergence of the posthuman, as well as 
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considered how the posthuman is implicated in two emerging phenomena: the 
increasing presence of video games in education and the widespread adoption of 
service-learning pedagogies. Video games are commonly associated with the 
posthuman, as they comprise complex virtual spaces in which players adopt 
virtual personas, form online communities, and build fictional worlds. But service 
learning, which is generally placed in the humanist tradition, is just as much a 
response to, and embrasure of, posthumanism. In the end, they are both identity 
machines, prostheses that allow us to extend our sense of self in productive 
ways, establishing networks and feedback loops that allow us to construct who 
we are in the world in relation to other beings. They are both technologies of the 
self in the Foucauldian tradition, technologies that reveal the constructedness of 
the self even as they naturalize the individual subjectivities that emerge form 
them.  
The roles of video games and service learning are important for scholars 
to consider as they investigate the continuing role of posthumanism in the 
academy. Revealingly, both situate the student outside of the traditional 
university classroom, emphasizing that connectivity with others is a key to 
learning. One danger of such an emphasis is that students will come to see the 
outside world as merely a tool to further their own personal agendas. Much like 
the self-reinforcing practices of ego psychology, service learning can leave intact 
traditional notions of the self (and, thus, the ideologies that sustain them), and 
may even leave them stronger than before. This possibility has been much 
analyzed in the case of service-learning, whose critics have often questioned the 
 138 
ability of individual service projects to give students a broad understanding of 
social structures, of the confluence of power and knowledge, and of the 
materiality that makes problems social rather than merely personal. In the case 
of gaming, most of the academic focus has been on games that employ the first-
person perspective, where one gamer assumes the identity of a single player and 
plays alone, essentially separate from other gamers.  Scholars might turn their 
attention to games where players do not assume a single or singular identity and 
in the future, focus on the social aspects of successful participation in gaming 
that take place off-screen, such as participation in guilds. Ideally, a responsible 
posthumanism can improve the educational value of both pedagogical areas 
while engendering a deeper understanding of the political in student lives. 
 
Political Posthumanism 
“What could be the politics of whatever singularity, that is, of a being 
 whose community is mediated not by any condition of belonging (being 
red, being Italian, being Communist) nor by the simple absence of 
conditions . . . , but by belonging itself?”  
– Giorgio Agamben, “The Coming Community” 
 
Politics calls on us to build a world in which the one and the many can 
coexist. But even the notion of constructing a world in relation to other beings 
may carry too much humanist weight for some. As Ann Weinstone writes, such 
statements may not move far enough away from the “logic of elite ownership: 
ownership of knowledge, land, material and psychic resources, and sociopolitical 
entitlements” that sustains humanism (25). “Even concepts such as consensus 
and intersubjectivity,” she writes, are “based on ownership.” In order to break 
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from this notion of relationships with others as the ownership of resources to 
expand individual subjects, posthumanism needs to continue to develop, as 
Hardt and Negri have noted, an understanding of the things owned in “common 
that allows [people] to communicate and act together” (xv).  
The most common misconception about posthumanism is that it is against 
either humans or humanism. Despite these straw man arguments, post-human 
does not mean anti-human. Proponents of posthumanism do not necessarily 
reject the autonomy of the human subject; rather, they acknowledge the multiple 
subjectivities within that autonomy. It is the classic problem of the political 
coexistence of the one and the many that scholars from Aristotle to Hegel to 
Deleuze and Guattari to Hardt and Negri have addressed. This has always been 
a concern of those who would identify as humanists and it continues to be a 
concern of posthumanists. As Mark Taylor and Esa Saarinen write in 
Imagologies, 
The fundamental philosophical problem in the West is the problem of the 
one and the many. From its beginnings in ancient Greece, western 
philosophy has identified being with oneness or unity and non-being with 
manyness or plurality. To be is to be one. . . . One of the most significant 
marks of the advent of modernity and its extension in postmodernity is a 
reversal of the relative value attributed to the one and the many. In 
contemporary culture, oneness and unity are regarded as non-being, while 
manyness and plurality are believed to characterize being.” (“Shift” 2) 
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The many offshoots of posthumanism attempt to place multiplicity at the core of 
this new mode of being, to allow for a whatever being that does not require a 
stable core of selfhood, and which can find identity in the unstable, flickering 
world of digital signifiers. It is within this instability that we might see the 
posthuman project as part of the postmodern project, and it is this instability that 
poses a similar challenge to each.  The challenge is to not let this lack of unity 
translate into immobility; in order to continue the posthumanist project, we “must 
prevent the absence of destination from creating a sense of purposelessness” 
(Taylor and Saarinen, Imagologies “Net” 12). This working through of 
ambivalence should be part of any definition of critical technological literacy 
applicable to the posthuman era. 
Admittedly, posthumanists are sometimes prone to utopian views of the 
possibility of a social revolution, to a coming community built on the ability of 
communication technologies to hasten a “democracy on a global scale” that 
brings together “radical differences, singularities, that can never be synthesized 
in an identity” (Hardt and Negri xi, 355). Posthumanists “want to prevent violence 
by undermining notions of a superior, self-willing, self-possessed person and its 
march toward ontological and epistemological transcendence” (Weinstone 4). But 
the current war in the Middle East bolstered by the quest to bring democracy to 
the world should give pause to those who think that an increasingly connected 
world will automatically result in fewer conflicts, greater understanding, and social 
justice.  
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As Baudrillard warns in “Prophylaxis and Virulence,” all “integrated and 
hyperintegrated systems . . . tend towards the extreme constituted by 
immunodeficiency. Seeking to eliminate all external aggression, they secrete 
their own internal virulence . . . and thus tend to self destruct” (35). The more 
we’re connected, the more likely that a single breakdown in one area will affect 
all the others.  While this connectivity means that one action in a network (or a 
series of connected networks in an integrated system) may have an effect on any 
or all of it’s component parts, the network itself often attempts to compensate to 
avoid collapse.  Witness the 2008 breakdown in the sub-prime mortgage arena. 
When the investment lender Bear Stearns seemed to be in financial trouble due 
to overinvestment in risky sub-prime mortgages that lost their value due to a drop 
in home values, the U.S. government stepped in to protect the economy. 
According to the Christian Science Monitor, the U.S. government “saved Bear 
Stearns from bankruptcy because a collapse of the investment bank would have 
reverberated throughout the economy – increasing the risk of lower incomes, 
lower home values, and unemployment for ordinary Americans” (Grier 1). Now, 
legislators are struggling to find ways to ensure that the “weaknesses of a single 
firm does not again threaten the whole economy” (Grier 1). But the very 
mechanism through which such companies gain access to global financial 
markets and flows of international capital are the same ones that expose them to 
the threat of systemic collapse. One cannot be plugged in and unplugged at the 
same time. 
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The realization that the interconnectedness of the modern world exposes 
us to increased risk would come as a shock to those who originally designed the 
most important network today: the internet. In 1964, when Paul Baran first 
considered possible structures for what would eventually become the internet, he 
rejected the idea of a centralized network in which all users connected to one 
central node. According to Baran, such a design would not be “redundant 
enough” and would thus be vulnerable because communication could easily be 
severed by the destruction of a single node (quoted in Barabási 144). Rather, he 
advocated a distributed network where “even if some nodes went down, 
alternative paths maintained the connection between the rest of the nodes" 
(quoted in Barabási 144). Although his ideas were initially resisted by industry 
and military leaders, they became the foundation for the internet’s current 
distributed structure.   
The crises to which modern networks are susceptible are not restricted to 
economic structures, but to cultural ones as well, including 21st century outbreaks 
of war and genocide. If posthumanists want to prevent such crises, they need to 
assess whether such events truly depend on the concepts of self that are the 
target of much posthumanist criticism, and consider the possibility of emergent 
posthuman justifications for violent and unjust actions. Relieved of the typical 
human range of bodily experience and situated instead within the more 
numerous yet seemingly less substantial virtual relations among posthumans, it 
is possible that we become more vulnerable to the politics of fear and anxiety. As 
Baudrillard warns, it is only in the “hyperprotected space [that] the body loses all 
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its defences” (35). Posthuman criticism of the subject may be too concerned with 
the humanist question of “Who is the subject?” and not concerned enough with 
the posthumanist question of “How is the subject?,” a question that would move 
us from questions of having to questions of being and doing.  
We must be wary of narratives that claim to be progressive by inverting 
hierarchies rather than translating them. For instance, John Carpenter's 2001 
science fiction film, Ghosts of Mars, focuses on the operation of a small military 
unit under the command of a female officer on the planet Mars. In the movie, the 
planet Mars is presented as being a matriarchy in which the government and its 
RSAs ("repressive state apparatuses," a la Althusser) are run by women. While 
this might seem initially to be a progressive premise, what occurs is a reversal of 
the sexes of the subjects without a change in hierarchical gender narratives. The 
men represent women and the women represent men, changing the positionality 
within the structure of gender relations, but without a significant change in the 
structure itself. In this case, the technology of gender continues unabated, and 
women are its fictional beneficiaries.   
In this film, women engage in a complete range of swearing, fighting, and 
other forms of physical and verbal assault. Men are subservient and referred to 
as "breeders" since their primary value is as possible mates for the women in 
charge. The main difference is that the men incessantly offer sexual favors to 
their bosses without intimidation or coercion. Seemingly, sexual harassment 
complaints are unlikely since sexual relations are being initiated by those not in 
positions of power. The Ghosts of Mars represents a male fantasy in which 
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subordinates actively pursue sexual relations with figures of authority and in 
which these authorities, instead of being implicated in sexual coercion, are free to 
choose from among their subordinates for their sexual partners. Ghosts of Mars 
does not represent an alternate social order, but our present one infused with 
pornographic sensibilities. If we are not careful, the same type of inversion can 
occur with the human/machine binary, resulting in a hyper-celebration of the 
cyborg. 
In our attempts to supplant the humanist framework in place in society, it 
is important to realize that, as Thomas Foster has written, “posthumanism is as 
likely to serve conservative agendas as progressive ones” (xii). The weakening of 
the inclusive narratives of humanism may actually make it harder for groups to 
identify with each other. And it seems possible that corporate interests have 
taken advantage of the posthuman era to turn classrooms into machinic factories 
for commercial knowledge and exploitable labor. In Democracy Matters, Cornel 
West claims that contemporary imperialism is composed of three related 
“antidemocratic dogmas”: free-market fundamentalism, aggressive militarism, 
and escalating authoritarianism (3). Technology enables the acolytes of these 
dogmas as much as it enables those who question them; both rely on the 
communicative, economic, and cultural networks of meaning transmitted through 
ideological systems. Whether posthuman educators embrace these doctrines or 
challenge them remains to be seen.  
The opportunity to produce citizens who are critically technologically 
literate is perhaps the greatest promise of posthuman education, an act capable 
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of releasing the “liberatory, ethicopolitical potentials” of posthumanism 
(Weinstone 20). Understanding the range of possible social structures and forms 
of relation as technologies which can be adopted in order to produce different 
modes of being is a useful practice. But understanding that such adoption is not 
always a matter of individual choice is a sobering observation that should temper 
our embrace of the more utopian views of a posthuman future. As our machinic 
consciousnesses overlap and approach indivisibility with other machines, 
posthumans will hopefully find themselves increasingly unable and unwilling to 
sink into enclaves of virtual community disconnected from the larger social world.  
 The broad implications for such separatism are already visible in the 
ongoing state of international conflict and the various neuroses of capitalism. 
Rethinking our relation to our political systems, to our environment, to our 
economies, to our technologies, to our work, to our leisure, and to other whatever 
beings is an unfinished, and ultimately unfinishable, project. The coming 
community is posthuman, but it may not be posthuman enough. 
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Notes 
1. Digital images of these two magazine covers are available online through 
Time.com: 
http://www.time.com/time/personoftheyear/archive/covers/1982.html and 
http://www.time.com/time/personoftheyear/archive/covers/2007.html 
 
2. Games have always called upon players to be and to do. The title of this 
chapter is a reference to a popular series of games from the Sierra Online 
company called the “Quest for Glory” series, the first of which was titled “So You 
Want to Be a Hero” (emphasis added). This chapter focuses on the doing that 
accompanies these virtual modes of being. 
 
3. The terms “video game enthusiasts” and “teachers” conceal as much as they 
reveal. The forum consisted of Jane Avrich, an author and English teacher; 
Steven Johnson, an author and Distinguished Writer in Residence at NYU’s 
Department of Journalism; Raph Koster, author and video game designer who 
led the design of MMORPGs such as Star Wars Galaxies and Ultima Online; and 
Thomas De Zengotita, a teacher and contributing editor of Harper’s Magazine. 
From the descriptions given at the start of the article, it’s unclear which two of the 
last three individuals comprise the “video game enthusiasts.” The forum was 
moderated by Bill Wasik, a senior editor of Harper’s Magazine. 
 
4. Gamers and game designers are related but separate communities of practice, 
and therefore the genres that each value and the conventions they follow will 
differ. In this chapter, I focus on the genres that gamers produce. It should be 
noted, however, that the documents produced by game designers represent 
another promising site of inquiry into the relationship between video games and 
technical writing. The most significant document to be looked at is likely the 
series of game “bibles” that developers use to organize and formalize ideas 
regarding characters, settings, quests, and other elements of the game world 
they are creating. The ongoing revision of the persistent virtual worlds of 
MMORPGs represents a significant challenge that such documents help 
manage. 
 
5. As gamers have taken greater roles as producers of game content, as games 
have given players greater control over their avatars, and as gamers have 
participated in more game-related activities outside of the bounds of the game 
itself, the intellectual property statements built into end user license agreements 
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have drawn increased scrutiny, especially due to their uneven enforcement. For 
an introduction to the tensions between corporate and individual property rights 
over game content, see T. L. Taylor’s “Whose Game Is This Anyway?” and Raph 
Koster’s “Declaring the Rights of Players.” 
  
6. The role of narrative in online games is heightened by the fact that gamers, 
especially when playing as members of a guild or other persistent social group, 
often use Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) systems that are separate from the 
gaming software to communicate with other players. A 2006 survey of World of 
Warcraft players who were members of guilds found that “Roughly 70% of the 
interviewees said they chatted regularly with their guild mates about topics 
ranging from game strategy to real-life personal issues” (Williams et al. 351). 
Such work does not even begin to calculate the amount of story-telling that likely 
goes on outside the game as well. 
 
7. Games often use technical texts as in-game plot elements. For instance, the 
Ultima series, the longest-running computer role-playing game franchise, has as 
a recurring plot element a book known as the “Codex of Ultimate Wisdom,” which 
is a book containing all knowledge about the fictional game world—a 
comprehensive help file, if you will. It is no surprise to find, then, that a gamer 
has created a web site that collects technical information regarding the Ultima 
series of games, and called his site “The Other Codex.” 
 
8. The PTA web site is no longer available online, as the guild has disbanded, 
but portions of the site can still be accessed through the Internet Archive 
Wayback Machine at 
http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.povartarewalliance.org/. The title of this 
web site, Povar-Tarew Alliance, is just one interpretation of the PTA acronym, 
which began as the Povarian Trades Association. When the Povar server on 
which the guild operated merged with another server named Tarew Marr to form 
the Xev server, the PTA changed the meaning of its acronym to Povar-Tarew 
Artisans in order to attract artisans from the discontinued Tarew server (later, 
when the focus of the group shifted away from crafting trade items, the acronym 
was re-interpreted as the Povar-Tarew Alliance). The PTA was active between 
1999 and March of 2005, a reasonably long life when one considers that 21% of 
guilds present at any given time on similar servers disappear after only one 
month (Williams et al. 349).  
 
9. Interestingly, one of the examples that Miller offers of a typical situation to 
which an individual might respond in a generic fashion is of “players instructing 
novice in a game” (157).  
 
10. The instances of cross-over between games and “real life” are too abundant 
to address here. In-game marriages, face-to-face player conferences, hyper-
representational avatars, the emergence of professional gaming, and the 
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existence of gaming-based services such as Internet Gaming Entertainment, 
where virtual currency, items, and whole accounts can be bought, represent just 
a few of the ways that games exceed the virtual worlds from which they emerge, 
and players engage in out-of-game activities through which acceptable game 
play is defined.  
 
11. Gamers who seek employment as beta testers of video games may be 
considering the gaming industry as a career choice, or they may simply be 
seeking the cultural capital that comes with having advanced knowledge of new 
games. Either way, they can become involved with industry-level technical 
communities at a young age. Online sites such as www.gamestester.com have 
even emerged to help “all those interested in playing games for a living” find jobs 
as beta testers. 
 
12. In EQ, although death is not permanent, players risk the loss of experience 
levels and abilities when they die in the game, as well as the functionality 
embodied in any of the equipment they were carrying at the time. If they do not 
retrieve their bodies within a set time limit, their bodies disappear from the game, 
and the items they are carrying are lost. 
 
13. The DigiPen Institute of Technology also offers degrees with more traditional 
names such as Bachelor’s degrees in computer science, computer engineering 
and production animation. 
 
14. The research related to service-learning is extensive and can be found within 
the traditional publications of many disciplines, as well as specialized journals 
such as the Michigan Journal of Community Service Learning and the Journal of 
Higher Education Outreach and Engagement. Good online sites to visit in order 
to gain an appreciation of the scope of the institutional support behind service 
learning would be the National Service Learning Clearinghouse at 
http://www.servicelearning.org/, and Campus Compact at 
http://www.compact.org/. Many states also have their own Campus Compact 
initiatives. 
 
15. Institutional economics was named so by Walton Hamilton in 1919 in “The 
Institutional Approach to Economic Theory.” This built on previous work by 
Thorstein Veblen and John Commons on the role of collective action in 
economics. It is commonly called the old institutional economics, as opposed to 
the new institutional economics associated with later scholars such as Ronald 
Coase, Douglass North, Oliver Williamson, and Claude Ménard. 
  
16. The link between service learning and the practical application of knowledge 
runs deep. The image accompanying Edward Zlotkowski’s 1996 article titled 
“Linking Service-Learning and the Academy” depicts five individuals in 
professional attire using saws, hammers, and boards to build an addition to a 
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school building. This associates service, even in reference to the academy, with 
practical needs and vocations (shelter and construction, respectively) (21). 
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